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I. Introduction
In the Paedagogus, the second volume of his three major works, Clement of Alexandria develops
a “Christian” ethic and sense of identity, which is dependent on one’s “habits, deeds, and
passions.”1 The work itself is directed toward “you who are children” and is intended to instruct
Christians in matters of character and behavior.2 Though he is preoccupied with attempting to
educate—rather, allowing his understanding of Christ to educate—Christians in regard to
appropriate behaviors and values, thereby defining and maintaining a unique sense of Christian
identity in late second century Alexandria, he is also at home in a culture of Greek and Jewish
philosophy and literature. As an educated, Greek-speaking, Alexandrian Christian, with a
significant indebtedness to both Plato and Philo, Clement is an ideal figure to engage with when
concerned with questions of identity among early Christians. By applying modern theoretical
frameworks and studies on identity, I aim to examine Clement’s ideal and demonstrate how
intertwined and permeated it is by that which he seeks to exclude. His aim of trying to regulate
behavior in order to maintain a distinct group cohesion is part of what is best understood as the
process of identity.
With this in mind, my central thesis is that the attempt itself, on the part of Clement, to
delineate the parameters of “Christian” identity through the drawing of exclusionary boundaries
and exhorting Christians to ethical behavior, is thoroughly engaged with and influenced by the
thought and behavior of those meant to remain on the other side of the boundary. Additionally,
Clement’s understanding of “Christian” identity is thoroughly influenced by ancient notions of

1
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Clement, Paedagogus, 1.1.1.
Clement, Paedagogus, 1.1.1.
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ethnicity. I have chosen the Paedagogus as my central text because, out of all of Clement’s
surviving works, it is most directly concerned with the facets of communal and individual
“Christian” identity. Put simply, Clement is attempting to explain to “he who is called a Christian”
how they should present, behave, and think in order to properly fall within the boundaries of being
a Christian and to appropriately appreciate the significance which that entails.3 It should be
remembered that Clement’s description is indeed an ideal and likely not reflected—certainly not
to the universal extent he would prefer—in the behaviors and actions of the vast majority of his
contemporaries.
The core of Clement’s construction of a Christian identity, embodied through behaviors,
depends on his appeals to authoritative sources, whether “Christian,” “Jewish,” or “pagan,” but
most importantly on his understanding of Christ as Educator and Logos. For Clement, a Christian
life is one in which believers are formed in the image and likeness of Christ, which can only be
achieved through understanding—and obeying—Christ as Educator of the “little ones.” Further,
Clement is deeply engaged with philosophers, theologians, and the literary traditions of multiple
different, but inseparable groups, and his use of quotations is demonstrative of this erudition.
Whether quoting from Paul, Proverbs, Homer, or Philo, Clement’s work is a clear proof that the
process of identity is dependent, in part, on a rhetoric of legitimacy and an appeal to authority.
Establishing a literary and intellectual continuity with the past through claiming an advanced
understanding of Jewish scriptures and Greek philosophy allowed Clement to imbue his ideal
“Christian” individual and community with a sense of established authority.
Of chief importance to this project is the necessary “other” in Clement’s construction of
Christian identity. Despite imagining an impermeable and easily intelligible boundary around this

3
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Christian identity—excluding the “other,” whether they be Jewish, Greek “pagans” or those who
claim gnōsis and “dare to call themselves perfect”—Clement is deeply engaged with and indebted
to the philosophies, literary works, and language of those spheres he seeks to marginalize. 4 Here
it is important to remember that Clement, who despite his own construction of identity, is also
situated at a nexus of intertwining, overlapping, and pre-existing identities which are inseparable
in that they have provided him with the very language which he uses to draw up a distinct sense
of self and community. This can be seen in his discussion of which type of men, based on character
and temperament, should be “excluded from our city,” a phrase which draws on the philosophical
project of Plato in his Republic.5 Despite his conscious efforts to distinguish himself—and his
readers—from his non-Christian contemporaries and predecessors, Clement finds himself
contributing to the same project of constructing the kallipolis that Plato sets about in the Republic,
which Clement occasionally quotes from directly and more often references indirectly.6 In his
dependence upon and preference toward Plato, Clement invites a non-Christian inside—indeed,
invites him to help construct—the boundaries of his “Christian” identity.
Opening his final work on Clement, Eric Francis Osborn, writes that “no one enjoyed
theology more than Clement, yet his skillful synthesis of Athens and Jerusalem has furrowed many
brows.”7 One purpose of this current project is to complicate the description of Clement’s work as
a “synthesis” of “Athens and Jerusalem”—here standing in for the imagined, independent
“classical” and “Jewish” traditions—and instead to support an understanding of Clement’s sense
of identity and his work as fully situated within an already Athenian Jerusalem, freely and
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frequently relying on both Plato and Philo, even while constructing something “new” out of these
intertwined traditions.

A Brief Biography
As an early Christian writer and philosopher who defies the traditional binary of orthodoxy and
heresy, occupying a more difficult position as “somewhat dubious in his ‘orthodoxy’ . . . but
nonetheless within the fold,” Clement is a crucial figure when investigating the construction and
boundaries of early Christian identities.8 Clement takes primary importance in this investigation,
as the writer who coined the phrase “the life called Christian.”9 And it is in the Paedagogus that
Clement lays out his catechesis, directed toward newly made Christians in order to instruct them
in the ways in which they should live and consequently, how they should embody Clement’s
imagined “Christian” identity.
Not much is known and few details are certain about the life of Titus Flavius Clemens, but
we can confidently describe him as an influential teacher and locate him in Roman Alexandria at
the end of the second century, where he wrote the Paedagogus and likely instructed elite
Alexandrians at some sort of school.10 What little we know comes primarily from his own writings
and from Eusebius of Caesarea, who wrote over a century after Clement’s death.11 Alexandria was
almost certainly not his place of birth—some sources place that as Athens, but this remains
unclear—and Osborn describes him as “a traveler, always moving on . . . [who] invites Greeks to

8

Denise Kimber Buell, Making Christians: Clement of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1999), 12.
9
Judith Lieu, Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World (New York: Oxford University Press,
2004), 164; Clement, Paedagogus, 2.1.1.
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Jennifer Otto, Philo of Alexandria and the Construction of Jewishness in Early Christian Writings (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2018), 48; Buell, Making Christians, 10; the specific nature of this “school” will be
discussed later in this introduction.
11
Buell, Making Christians, 10.
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desert to God’s side and to enjoy the danger of change.”12 Though he was evidently highly
educated and possessed an extensive literary background, we do not know much about Clement’s
formal training—whether he was educated in the Ephobia of Athens as Osborn suggests—but he
himself tells us that he left home to travel the Mediterranean in search of knowledge. 13 In his
travels, he encountered an eclectic variety of teachers from a diverse span of geographic origins,
including Ionia, Coele-Syria, Assyria, and Palestine.14 Yet his greatest teacher he found “hiding in
Egypt,” a man he referred to as “the Sicilian-bee” and whom scholars have identified as Pantaenus,
an influential Alexandrian theologian who is traditionally regarded as Clement’s predecessor at
the “catechetical” school of Alexandria.15 Clement then settled in Egypt for the majority of his
career, teaching and living in Alexandria, where he developed “a strong Alexandrian flavor” in his
choice of sources, “the allegorical method that he favors, and the middle-platonic timbre of his
philosophical presuppositions.”16
Toward the end of his life, he was driven to Palestine by persecution in Alexandria, likely
during 202 or 206 CE.17 The last fragment of Clement’s life comes to us in the form of a letter
from his former student, the Bishop of Jerusalem, Alexander, “recommending him to the church
in Antioch,” which can be dated to around 205 CE.18 Prior to his departure, while settled in
Alexandria for the final decades of the second century, Osborn writes that Clement’s “intellectual
voyages did not cease . . . he explored the Bible, philosophy and literature, often preserving
fragments of philosophers who would otherwise be lost today, and quoting classical writers with
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affection and sensitivity.”19 Exploration and movement characterized Clement’s understanding of
spiritual matters and he, “more than any other early Christian writer, knew and enjoyed Greek
philosophy and literature. Saturated with study of this culture, he belonged to Alexandria, a city
which was ruled by it.”20
Based in cosmopolitan Alexandria for the majority of his literary career, Clement would
have been enveloped in a cultural atmosphere that was steeped in the influence of both Platonic
and Philonic philosophy, the latter of which was already intertwined with the former.21 Clement’s
surviving writings demonstrate his familiarity with the literary, philosophical, and religious
traditions around him. He cites scripture over five thousand times, Philo three hundred times,
Homer two hundred and forty times, and calls on well over three hundred classical authors,
including over six hundred citations of Plato alone.22 Further demonstrating the literary resources
available to Clement, Annewies van den Hoek has painstakingly shown that he had access to most
of Philo’s works while in Alexandria and that he utilized them extensively, despite few explicit
references.23

The Alexandrian Ekklēsia: Community, Authority, and Rivalry
Clement’s ties to the city, its elite circles of educated Greeks, and its long traditions of philosophy,
merit a brief discussion of the Christian community in Alexandria itself. Describing Clement’s
audience, Denise Kimber Buell asserts that “Clement writes for people who have surrounded
themselves with things Greek, who speak Greek, who are at least passingly familiar with Homer,

19
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Euripides, and the veneration of Greek deities, and who are quite keenly aware of Alexandria’s
fashionable culture.”24 As Buell has already demonstrated in an earlier study, despite Clement’s
universalizing language of address, his assumptions and emphases in the Paedagogus often
indicate that he is primarily addressing educated, well-off, Greek, male Christians.25 These
assumptions and emphases themselves contribute toward his construction of a “Christian” identity
in a less explicit manner, in that they reveal who Clement is not addressing. This is not to say that
Clement’s words do not apply to the non-educated, non-Greek, non-male, but these categories do
not take precedence in his conception of a “Christian.”
A new question arises then: namely, who was Clement in late second century Alexandria
and how did he function as an authoritative figure among the city’s Christian community? Judith
Lieu argues that “despite his own assured tone, the context and extent of Clement’s own authority
within the church in Alexandria remains uncertain.”26 Buell concurs with Lieu and notes that
Clement “employs language that naturalizes and authorizes his own speaking position, while also
differentiating him from his competitors,” whose very presence calls into question the extent of
his authority and influence.27 Rather than speaking for an undivided church, Clement and his
opponents claim the same authority, but this reflects a period when these Christian communities
and teachers “struggled for existence, identity, and dominance.”28
In Clement’s own writings we find a glimpse of the Christian community of Alexandria,
“which has its orders of deacons, priests and bishops but is not set under one supreme bishop,”
where the “chief activity” of the early Christian ekklēsia was to teach, and whose authority came

24

Denise Kimber Buell, Why This New Race: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2005), 156.
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Buell, Making Christians, 130.
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Judith Lieu, Marcion and the Making of a Heretic: God and Scripture in the Second Century (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 133.
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Buell, Making Christians, 12.
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from influential teachers, not from bishops.29 Clement’s writings do not reflect the tension between
priests and teachers that would later characterize the Alexandrian Christian community, and he
even characterizes himself as “a true priest of the church and a true deacon of the will of God, who
does and teaches the things of the lord.”30 This gives us a picture of an Alexandria where the line
between episcopal authority and charismatic teachers was not yet defined, though this would soon
change with the bishopric of Demetrius and the subsequent conflicts which resulted in the
departure of Origen from the city.31
Further contextualizing Clement’s location in the Alexandrian ekklēsia, Buell argues that
his “total silence on ecclesial organization makes more plausible a reconstruction of his role in
Alexandria as that of one Christian teacher among many.”32 David Dawson agrees, maintaining
that “Clement’s circle was only one among many, including those of Valentinus and Basilides
[‘gnostic’ opponents of Clement’s] that existed apart from the institutional control of a bishop.”33
Thus, despite Clement’s claim of belonging to—and possessing authority within—a global
ekklēsia that preserved apostolic teachings, his exact position within the Alexandrian ekklēsia is
difficult to ascertain; as is the very unity of such an ekklēsia.34 Alexandrian Christianity was not a
monolith and this is emphasized by the lack of a unified episcopal authority during the late second
century. Yet none of this even touches on the vast majority of Alexandrian Christians, whom
Clement refers to as “the many simple believers,” who were likely to “be poor and diverse” and
who were not situated within the same cultural and intellectual nexus as Clement.35

29

Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, 22.
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Osborn claims that Clement had access to a scriptorium and library in Alexandria, which
established the city as a center of Christian learning and teaching, enabling Clement “to achieve
his interpretation of the bible and his appropriation of the classical tradition.”36 While Osborn
masterfully reconstructs an image of late second century Alexandria, I argue that he errs in his use
of the word “appropriation.” Clement could not appropriate the classical tradition, because he
belonged to it as much as his “pagan” contemporaries did. Clement’s engagement and explanation
of scripture was “intelligible to his culture,” as Osborn claims, not because he masterfully stole
the language of his culture, but precisely because he resided within his culture.37 Right from the
start, it is important to recognize that Clement’s project of defining “Christian” necessitates a
certain porousness of boundaries, due to his cultural setting, the language he uses, the metaphors
he draws upon, and the ideas which have shaped his thinking. Certainly, he spoke “beyond” the
church and encouraged Greek “pagans” to “find the treasure which was in Christ,” but he did not
write to proselytize as an unintelligible colonizer.38

The Legacy of Philo
Without much evidence on the origins of the Alexandrian Christian community, scholars have
sought to fill in the gaps with a variety of theories—primarily of a continuity between an existing
Jewish community and early Christians—but there is an obvious watershed moment in the history
of Alexandria that renders this largely moot.39 This would be the violent conflict between the
Roman state and its Jewish subjects during the reign of Trajan, which “radically attenuated that

36
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39
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and Its Philonic Heritage,” 80.
37

9

continuity.”40 There is still much debate over whether there was a direct continuity between a
Jewish synagogue in Alexandria and the early Christian ekklēsia, but Clement’s deep familiarity
with Philonic thought demonstrates an intellectual engagement at the very least, if not any lived
interactions.41 Hoek argues in favor of a “primarily” literary link between Clement and the Jewish
community of Alexandria as opposed to one based on lived interactions with Jewish scholars.42
Supporting this argument, David T. Runia suggests a “rescue operation,” undertaken on the part
of Clement’s teacher, Pantaenus, in order to preserve the Hellenistic-Jewish works of Philo and
other writers from being forgotten in the aftermath of the decimation of the Alexandrian Jewish
community.43
Whatever the exact nature of this continuity—I would agree with Hoek that it was primarily
literary—the importance here is to note that Clement was thoroughly indebted to and familiar with
the writings of the first century Jewish philosopher, Philo of Alexandria. Yet, it is important not to
misinterpret Clement’s use of Philo as an instance of a “Christian” philosopher appropriating the
work of a “Jewish” predecessor, because as Jennifer Otto writes, Clement likely “encountered
Philo’s texts via a chain of transmission that flowed through the philosophical circles of the
Mediterranean world [rather] than via a direct inheritance of an Alexandrian Jewish exegetical
tradition.”44 For Clement, Philo is not a representative of a living, i.e. rival, Alexandrian, Jewish
community, but a great thinker and member of the ancient philosophical traditions that he has
inherited and who demonstrates the compatibility of Greek and Jewish wisdom.45 Philo was a
Jewish writer, certainly, but it was not only in this identity that Clement encountered him; rather,
Hoek, “The ‘Catechetical’ School of Early Christian Alexandria and Its Philonic Heritage,” 80.
Otto, Philo of Alexandria, 198.
42
Hoek, “The ‘Catechetical’ School of Early Christian Alexandria and Its Philonic Heritage,” 80.
43
David T. Runia, “Clement of Alexandria and the Philonic Doctrine of the Divine Power(s),” Vigiliae Christianae
58, no. 3 (2004): 257.
44
Otto, Philo of Alexandria, 48, 198.
45
Otto, Philo of Alexandria, 198.
40
41

10

Clement’s reception of Philo was much the same as his reception of other Platonic philosophers.
Already, there is a complex interplay between identities which can be labelled as “Jewish,”
“Christian,” “Greek,” etc., simultaneously, subsequently, or situationally.
The importance of Philo in the Alexandrian Christian tradition is such that many writers
not only name him “as part of their own tradition, [but that] it is clear that they meant by that much
more than that someone had stumbled upon some interesting leftover scrolls.”46 The first century
philosopher had so deeply influenced the intellectual atmosphere of Alexandria, that nearly two
centuries later, Origen would identify him explicitly as one of his predecessors, even more so than
Clement, himself.47 Both Origen and Clement made use of Philo’s exegetical work and inherited
his Platonism, a combination “in which the Platonic underpinnings corroborate their biblical
explorations, [which] may represent their greatest debt to Philo.”48

The Catechetical School
The so-called “catechetical school” of Alexandria has been discussed and debated for centuries,
producing a large body of scholarship on its origins, characteristics, role among the Alexandrian
Christian community, and its relationship with official episcopal authority in the city.49 The school
itself is not the subject of this work, but a brief discussion of it is necessary here in order to
contextualize Clement’s authority as a teacher. Eusebius of Caesarea is our primary source of
information on the school and although he indicates a fixed tradition, with a continuous line of
succession from Pantaenus to Clement to Origen, his most severe critics dispense with his model

Hoek, “The ‘Catechetical’ School of Early Christian Alexandria and Its Philonic Heritage,” 82.
Hoek, “The ‘Catechetical’ School of Early Christian Alexandria and Its Philonic Heritage,” 83.
48
Hoek, “The ‘Catechetical’ School of Early Christian Alexandria and Its Philonic Heritage,” 79.
49
Hoek, “The ‘Catechetical’ School of Early Christian Alexandria and Its Philonic Heritage,” 59.
46
47
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entirely.50 The traditional assumption—originating with Eusebius—that there existed an
authorized catechetical school of Alexandria, headed by Clement, and under the control of the
bishop, has since been convincingly challenged by a variety of scholars in the twentieth century.51
Taking into account these contributions, it seems that a catechetical school in the manner described
by Eusebius is unlikely, but both Osborn and Hoek are notable dissenters from a reconstruction
which is overly critical of Eusebius.52
Hoek critiques an easy dismissal of Eusebius, whose reconstruction some scholars replace
with an imagined “unofficial” Alexandrian school, centered on charismatic teachers. 53 Analyzing
Clement’s writings and his choice of words when describing his own activity, she argues that
“Clement evidently sees himself in an ecclesiastical setting, appointed in the church by no less
than Christ himself.”54 This does not confirm the idealized picture of Eusebius, but neither does it
favor modern reconstructions that sideline the traditional model entirely. Rather, it seems that the
dividing line between church and school was not yet present and that Clement understood his own
instruction of the faithful as taking place fully within the context of the church.55 While she agrees
that Eusebius must be read critically, Hoek cautions against dismissing all of his claims and
adopting modern reconstructions which are as difficult, if not more so, to prove.56
While keeping in mind Buell and Dawson’s understandings of Clement and his circle as
“one among many,” it seems reasonable to conclude that there were existing traditions of
catechetical instruction and philosophical debate which were passed on from Clement’s

Hoek, “The ‘Catechetical’ School of Early Christian Alexandria and Its Philonic Heritage,” 60, 61.
Buell, Making Christians, 12; Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, 19.
52
Buell, Making Christians, 12.
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Hoek, “The ‘Catechetical’ School of Early Christian Alexandria and Its Philonic Heritage,” 61
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55
Hoek, “The ‘Catechetical’ School of Early Christian Alexandria and Its Philonic Heritage,” 71; Clement,
Paedagogus, 1.18.4.
56
Hoek, “The ‘Catechetical’ School of Early Christian Alexandria and Its Philonic Heritage,” 85, 86.
50
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contemporaries to Origen’s, while also agreeing that Pantaenus and Clement taught private circles
of elite, educated, Greek-speaking, Christian students who were not necessarily representative, nor
the most influential members of the broader ekklēsia.57 In closing this section, I would agree with
Buell when she writes that: “whether or not Clement speaks with institutional backing, it is crucial
to interpret his writings as arguments for a particular vision of Christian identity, not merely
articulations of already determined doctrinal positions.”58

Theoretical Framework: Identity as Process
I am most reliant on and indebted to Judith Lieu’s broader framework for understanding identity,
which she lays out in Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World. At the start of
her work, Lieu asks two important questions: “In what form can a cohesive Christian identity be
articulated, and how does that identity subsist in relation to other structural identities?”59
Acknowledging the inherent anachronism of the terms “identity” and “construction,” which reflect
“the particular intellectual and ideological preoccupations of the contemporary world,” Lieu
nonetheless asserts identity as a useful lens.60 This lens and subsequent theoretical models are
useful because ancient Mediterranean society, early Christianity in particular, was thoroughly
invested in questions of peoplehood and group belonging.
By Lieu’s definition, identity involves “ideas of boundedness, of sameness and difference,
of continuity, perhaps of a degree of homogeneity, and of recognition by self and by others.”61 She

Buell, Making Christians, 12; Otto, Philo of Alexandria, 49-50; Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, 19; Hoek, “The
‘Catechetical’ School of Early Christian Alexandria and Its Philonic Heritage,” 71; although Hoek questions the use
of the term “private,” it suffices to meet the need here.
58
Denise Kimber Buell, Making Christians, 12.
59
Lieu, Christian Identity, 7.
60
Lieu, Christian Identity, 11; Maia Kotrosits insightfully critiques Lieu’s use of “identity,” in Rethinking Early
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further accepts that identity is socially constructed, dynamic, and subject to change. 62 Important
concepts in Lieu’s construction of identity—which I will adopt with slight modifications to attend
to the concerns of other scholars—include a required “other,” fluidity and exchange, claims of
continuity, “frontiers” rather than impermeable borders, and the creative/constructive role of texts
as “acts of power.” Each of these concepts will become important in an examination of the
Paedagogus to understand what Clement is doing and how he is engaged in the process of identity.

The Other
Concerned with “the other,” Lieu points out that attempts to construct a group identity also
construct an opposing identity, as “similarity implies the possibility of difference;” the “us”
implies a “them,” and “the description of the self demands the description of the other.” 63 Buell’s
concept of “ethnic reasoning” (the deployment of rhetorical strategies for the purposes of group
identification) will be of primary importance when examining how Clement uses established
patterns of describing “the other”—most notably using “ethnoracial” terminology—in his attempt
to define his proper “Christian;”64 as will her larger project of identity which “has been one of
bringing to the forefront evidence of early Christian appropriations of the categories ‘race’ and
‘ethnicity’ (genos, ethnos, laos, phylos) in formulating that community’s own narratives of selffashioning and group identity.”65
An important consequence of Buell’s analysis is the complication of the idea that
Christianity broke the mold and separated religion from its surrounding contexts, which has been
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asserted in “three overlapping ways:” that Christianity is universal and not tied to ethnoracial
differences, that it is otherworldly in focus, and that it is “a religion of conversion or volunteerism,
rather than of birth.”66 She points out that “these arguments presuppose that ethnicity/race in
antiquity is never part of a universalizing rhetoric,” which does not fit the context of an early
Christian world where “most people were not embedded in a static matrix, but rather a dynamic
and cosmopolitan one.”67 It is this dynamic context that results in the ability for the universalizing
claims of many early Christian writers to cohabitate with her designation of Christianity as an
“ethnoracial” group. Use of “ethnoracial” terminology does not counteract nor contradict
universalizing claims. Buell’s work is important in combatting the latent anti-Judaism and
supersessionism that creeps into scholarship through the image of a non-racial, de-ethnicized
Christianity (which is too often juxtaposed with the image of an overtly ethnic Judaism, to which
it is cast as superior).
A consequence of ignoring Buell’s work and of interpreting Christianity as “unmoored
from the messy specificities of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘culture’” is the devaluation of references to
Christian ritual practice and the assumption that Christian usage of genos, ethnos, and laos are
uniquely metaphorical and are located “above” sociopolitical embeddedness.68 Modern
scholarship must address the ways in which early Christian writers, such as Clement, utilized what
Buell calls “ethnic reasoning” in order to “legitimize various forms of Christianness as the
universal, most authentic manifestation of humanity, [and] offered Christians both a way to define
themselves relative to ‘outsiders’ and to compete with other ‘insiders’ to assert the superiority of
their varying visions of Christianness.”69
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ἔθνος, γένος, and λαός: People-Language of the Ancient Mediterranean
Here it is important to briefly discuss the three most commonly used Greek words to denote
ancient-people groups: ethnos, genos, and laos. Each of these words came with a breadth of
applications and connotations, none of which can be said to be the perfect equivalent of modern
understandings of “ethnicity.”70 Indeed, the ancient Greeks were not in possession of a single word
that we can point to and—without reservation or qualification—call “ethnicity,” but each of these
words were often used in ways which we can identify with Buell’s understanding of “ethnic
reasoning.” Although none can be easily identified as “ethnicity,” as the etymological forebear of
the word, ethnos “is a good place to start, since it is widely used as a standard way to denote
people-groups.”71
Ethnos was often used to describe non-human units of classification—such as various
species of animals—but when restricting its usage to human people-groups, it could still range
from an entire nation, to the inhabitants of a single polis, to members of a specific guild.72 Jeremy
McInerney notes that the term “served as a conveniently loose label, equivalent to the vague
English term ‘people.’”73 While ethnos can be used as our standard when identifying ancient
people-groups, genos has a more specific connotation, typically implying a—occasionally
fictive—notion of “shared descent.”74 However, it can often be used as both a subdivision and a
synonym of ethnos. Finally, laos “seems always to refer to groups of human beings such as
soldiers, sailors, country-folk, or a gathered crowd . . . [but it] also came to be used to refer to the
whole population, which might equally be described as an ἔθνος or γένος—‘the people’ as a

70

David G. Horrell, Ethnicity and Inclusion: Religion, Race, and Whiteness in Constructions of Jewish and
Christian Identities (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2020), 220.
71
Horrell, Ethnicity and Inclusion, 220.
72
Horrell, Ethnicity and Inclusion, 220.
73
Horrell, Ethnicity and Inclusion, 220.
74
Horrell, Ethnicity and Inclusion, 223.

16

collective whole.”75 In regard to Clement’s usage of these terms, there is a stark difference. He
most often defaults to genos when describing Christians as a people-group and exclusively refers
to non-Christian, non-Jewish Greeks as the ethnē.76 The significance and implications of these
terms will be further explored at a later point in this chapter and more extensively in the following
one.
None of these terms are a perfect match for modern understandings of ethnicity, but they
are the key terms that ancient Greek authors applied when describing or defining various peoplegroups, which modern theories of identity read as ethnic groups.77 This can be seen in Clement’s
Stromateis, where we find the earliest example of the phrase “τρίτον γένος”—those whom Clement
claims “are Christians”—in the context of arguing that the ancient Greeks “knew God but did not
know or worship him in the right way.”78 This is part of Clement’s understanding of the role of
the Christ/Logos as Educator, improperly understood by those living before the Incarnation and
Crucifixion. He does not see Christians as articulating a new God, but a new way of worshipping
him, which indicates a change in peoplehood as defined by practice and mode of worship.79
Clement describes the emergence of this “third race,” not as a people defined by biological heritage
but by correct worship. In Clement’s world, practice and peoplehood are synonymous, and genos
indicates both the “specific ‘kind’ of Christian worship and the people themselves.”80
Utilizing Buell’s model, Horrell argues that Clement uses both an “aggregative” and an
“oppositional” form of ethnic reasoning. The former is part of a “universalizing strategy,
suggesting that all can be incorporated into this new people of God,” through transformation and
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crossing the imagined boundary into the “one race of the saved,” while the latter “draws a contrast
between the Christian’s old and new identity, describing the putting off of the old person and the
putting on of the immortality of Christ ‘in order that we may become new, a holy people, born
again.’”81

Fluidity and Exchange, Dependency and Borrowing
Early Christianity—and any of its attending concepts of identity—cannot be described outside of
the world it interacted with, and thus it needs to be situated within and seen as engaged with
neighboring and overlapping senses of identity, both contributing to and receiving from them.
None of the identities adjacent to and overlapping with early Christians were mutually exclusive
senses of self, and therefore we can only attempt to understand any one people-group through
understanding its relations to neighboring senses of identity.82
Therefore, in discussing the context of Clement’s conceptualizing a “Christian” identity, it
is important to consider the movement known as the “second sophistic,” which Tim Whitmarsh
describes as a response to the “crisis of posterity” during which “many of the literary players of
this period negotiated the boundaries of their cultural membership and affiliation.”83 The reason
this movement among classical writers is relevant is because it demonstrates that the continued
negotiation of identity and its boundaries were not an exclusively Jewish and Christian problem
but one that also extended to ideas of Greekness and Romanness. Christianity was not alone in this
ongoing process of self-definition. The “Greeks” and “Romans” were already aware of “sameness
and of difference, of a shared past and agreed values, of continuities and of boundaries” as
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Christians began to construct an identity within the empire and Jewish self-definition continued to
evolve in the Graeco-Roman world, both in the late Second Temple period and afterwards.84
Relevant to this idea of relation to and continuity with adjacent identities, Arthur Urbano
notes the faults of the often used concepts of “borrowing” and “dependency.” Many early
Christians who had received a Greek education—Clement in this case—depicted their own
philosophic and intellectual activities in terms of theft or “borrowing” from surrounding cultures.
However, modern scholarship must question these ancient understandings of cultural exchange,
despite the ease with which we could “fall back uncritically on what we might call the ‘spoliation,’
or ‘dependency,’ model according to which Christians borrowed and copied ideas, practices, and
artistic styles that really belonged to Romans, Greeks, and Jews.”85 Urbano argues that early
Christians did not inhabit the Graeco-Roman and Jewish worlds, as foreign appropriators or
“cultural scavengers;” despite these early Christian writers understanding their own interactions
with other philosophic and literary traditions as “a conscious adoption and adaption of Greek
learning to beautify and augment the expression of Christianity . . . we cannot accept this narrative
uncritically without considering what was already unconsciously inscribed in early Christian
intellectuals as native residents of a vast and varied Roman world.”86 Clement and his fellows were
not the thieves they imagined themselves to be and their Christianity was not independent of the
world around them in the way that they conceptualized it. Instead, these writers and philosophers
were educated alongside their pagan contemporaries, they “shared teachers and classrooms, and
lived in overlapping social words. Thus any notion of ‘borrowing’ or ‘despoiling’ becomes
moot.”87
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This understanding of overlapping, inseparable identities, in addition to the creation of “the
other,” necessitates the inclusion of the work of Éric Rebillard. Rebillard critiques previous
scholarship as reifying distinct categories of ancient peoples, despite a supposedly postmodern
aversion to doing such and toward understanding boundaries as “contingent and fluctuating.”88
The blame for this reification lies partially on scholarship, but is understandable when we look at
our sources. Due to the nature of our materials, we are presented with constructions of Christian
identities that are “internally homogenous and externally bounded.”89 As Lieu notes, “our texts
resist their confinement to the local.”90 Yet Rebillard draws attention to the “disjuncture between
the thematization of ethnicity and its enactment in everyday life,” which extends beyond the
concept of ethnicity to include other aspects of identification which might have been assumed by
an individual living in late antiquity.91 With this disjuncture in mind, “we should no longer assume
that the behavior of Christians was predominantly determined by their religious allegiance (despite
the demands of the bishops) . . . [and this also indicates] that we should instead ask how and in
which contexts Christianness became salient in Christians’ everyday life.” 92 According to
Rebillard’s theory, identification as a “Christian” would have been of “episodic character” and
“activated in a situation”—activated meaning becoming the primary mode of identification based
upon hyper-specific situational encounters—rather than consistently superseding all other forms
of identification.93
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The Frontier
The “seduction of identity” is that “the encircling boundary appears both given and immutable,
when it is neither.”94 In combatting this “seduction,” Lieu prefers the term “frontier” to “boundary”
or “border.” For Lieu, frontiers “do not represent fixed lines so much as zones of influence or areas
of control . . . then, as now, they lay themselves open to mockery at human conceit.”95 Dispensing
with boundaries, borders, and the idea that identities are static across space and time, Lieu argues
that these various identities find their edges better characterized by the concept of “the frontier,”
and despite attempts at separation, the best the constructors of identity have ever been capable of
is “temporary check points rather than concrete walls.”96 The frontier is best understood as a place
of “construction and contention,” “movement and connectedness,” and permeability which
encourages “interaction, while providing rules for it.”97 Aptly summarizing her framework, Lieu
writes that “identity is to do with change and with the encounter with others.”98
Buell’s “ethnic reasoning” returns with a new importance in the context of the
frontier/border, as early Christian authors used it to “argue that individuals need to transform
themselves, for example, into members of a saved, righteous, immovable, or true genos, a holy or
special laos.”99 Far from claiming an immutable concept of ethnicity or race, Clement and his
contemporaries often “speak about crossing the threshold from outsider to insider as the
assumption of a new ethnoracial identity.”100 If we re-conceptualize the “borders” of identity with
Lieu’s “frontier,” then the action of “crossing” it takes on an entirely different meaning and implies
a longer process of identity, engaged on multiple fronts and from multiple angles, as opposed to
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an envisioned swapping of distinct identities. This idea of the “frontier” and the boundaries of
Clement’s “Christian” identity, will be further explored in the penultimate chapter of this thesis,
but for now it is important to state that Clement’s use of ethnoracial imagery and language, in
tandem with his proscriptions on certain behaviors and practices, are directly relevant to his
conceptualization of Christianness and its parameters.101

An Act of Power
Finally, the creative role of texts is tied to Lieu’s understanding of “acts of power,” in that through
texts we are often presented with authorial constructions of identity, but that these constructions
“become alive as we discover the way [in which they] construct readers and ‘reality’ through acts
of power, by silence and marginalization, as well as by unarticulated assumptions, by the values
and hierarchies engendered, and by the authoritative voice claimed.”102 As Rebillard notes, the
“bishops did succeed in constructing Christian identity as that of a bounded group,” and the very
fact that so much theoretical work has gone into complicating “identity” itself demonstrates the
effectiveness of this construction.103 A central premise of Lieu’s framework is that “texts construct
a world,” and that:
They do this out of the multiple worlds, including textual ones, that they and their
authors and readers already inhabit and experience as ‘reality’; that new world itself
becomes part of subsequent ‘reality’ within and out of which new constructions
may be made. Yet this is not a self-generating system: constructions and worlds
interact and clash with others, whether they are seen as congenial or as alien. It is
this dynamic process that constitutes the field of our explorations in what follows,
yet always at its edges will hover the elusive question of how, if at all, such textual
knowledge becomes embodied, constructing Christians.104
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Indebted to the scholarship above, I hope to make a contribution toward the growing study of early
Christian identities and the impact these processes have on the continued development of
“Christian identity” today. As an influential theologian of the early Church and perhaps the most
immersed in Greek philosophy of the loosely defined “Church Fathers,” Clement is an ideal figure
to study when examining the overlap, conflict, and exchange which takes place at the intersections
of various identities. In the intervening centuries, Clement himself has become—through the
survival of his work and influence—a touchstone which contemporary Christians engaged in the
process of identity can appeal to.
Given the diversity that exists alongside the unity in the Church, it seems to me that an
examination of how individuals such as Clement navigated some of these questions—both
critiquing and appreciating his efforts—can generate fruitful conversations and solutions today.
As the Church, both as communal identity and the diverse individuals comprising it, attempts to
grapple with questions of race, gender, and marginalization, it seems to me that an examination of
how individuals such as Clement navigated some of these questions—both critiquing and
appreciating his efforts—can generate fruitful conversations and solutions today.
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II. Establishing an Authoritative Past
Continuity as Authority: The Need for History in Identity-Construction
“Without continuity there can be no identity, and it is continuity over time, with all its inherent
ambiguities of change and sameness, that offers the greatest challenges and the greatest rewards,”
writes Judith Lieu, and the validity of this argument serves as the cornerstone of not only this
chapter, but the larger project of investigating identity itself. 105 Among early Christians, the most
crucial tool in the formation of a distinct and intelligible identity was the ability to insert
themselves into the salvation narrative they found in Jewish scripture and thereby establishing a
continuity with scriptural figures, promises, and prophecies. In order to claim a present identity,
early Christians were first tasked with constructing an authoritative past. Clement did this through
conceiving of a patrilineage which began with the Christ/Logos, flowed through the prophets and
apostles, and expressed itself in his time through himself, other Christian teachers, and the proper
behavior of the Christian ekklēsia or “the assembly of little ones.”106
Clement demonstrates this when he writes: “Of old, the Word educated through Moses,
and after that through the Prophets . . . the Word of God, is our Educator. It is to Him that God has
entrusted us, as a loving Father delivering His children to a true Educator.” 107 The importance of
Christ as the Word of God and Educator cannot be overstated here. It is through the Christ/Logos,
or the Word, that Clement and the “little ones” are able to claim a continuity with biblical figures
and thus with divine intent and command, and it is this continuity which sustains his construction
of a Christian identity. Lieu argues that in order to understand how early Christians were embedded
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in and actively engaged with the dynamics of the late second and early third centuries in the
Mediterranean world, we need to investigate both continuity and discontinuity between “Greek,
Roman, Jewish, and Christian efforts to construct and to maintain an identity for themselves, in
interaction with their past as well as with each other.”108
This idea of continuity is often assumed to exist in a concrete manner and dubbed “history”
in popular discourse, which obscures the constructed nature of the ideological frameworks which
scholars impose on subjects of the distant past. Rather than repeat time-honored aphorisms of how
investigating the past is crucial to understanding the present—which neither Lieu, nor myself
object to—she argues that “no less important is the question, ‘how did the present create the
past?’”109 This is the task which Buell tackles in much of her scholarship, professing the obligation
of modern scholars, “culturally marked as white and Christian . . . to struggle against both racist
and anti-Jewish interpretive frameworks that have served to mask and sustain white Christian
privilege.”110 Pointing to the importance of reconstructed patrilineages of orthodoxy, existing in
opposition to “an infinite variety of so-called heretics,” Buell critiques scholarship which
perpetuates the constructions of Clement and his contemporaries in ways both subtle and obvious:
including the designation of “church fathers,” and even “patristics” itself.111
Nevertheless, modern scholars did not invent this “history.” Clement himself, establishing
his own authority over what is and is not “Christian” or applicable to “the Christian way of life”
does so by imagining a continuity between himself and “Wisdom Himself, the Word of the
Father.”112 This is evident in his profession that the Word, which spoke through Moses, the
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prophets, and the apostles for the purposes of educating “the little ones,” now speaks through him
in his instructive remarks on how his readers are to behave.113 In order to establish this continuity,
Clement relies on the use of scriptures—used here in a “loose” sense, denoting texts which were
understood to have moral and theological significance by Clement—available to him, the classical
“pagan” authors who defined his education, and his understanding of Christ as an active deity,
with a pedagogical purpose, engaged in the transmission of “true knowledge.”114 Citations from
these varying sources constitute Clement’s rhetoric of legitimacy and are the foundations of all of
his claims to authority, legitimacy, and continuity. It is key to keep in mind that Clement is not
only reacting to or receiving established categories of “Christian” and “heretic,” but also actively
engaged in constructing them in order to authorize his own position as a valid teacher to pass along
the knowledge of the only true Educator, which is to be found in Christ.115
On the other hand, Clement, in defending the validity of his theological arguments, is
making these appeals to an authoritative past, not as some novel form of identity-making, but
rather following in the vein of Jewish writers like Josephus and Philo, who made arguments from
antiquity and “ancient wisdom” an essential aspect of their own communal and individual
identities.116 It is the task here to investigate how Clement utilized these tools in order to construct
his own authority and imagine a continuity which begins with God and His Word, traces through
Moses and the prophets, to the apostles and ultimately, to himself and other teachers of the “little
ones.”
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Many early Christian writers were involved in this rewriting, remembering, and forgetting
of scriptural history, often through the appropriation of significant figures—such as Moses and
subsequent prophets—which allowed them to claim that they were continuous with and truly
embodying what had been handed down, directly from God.117 Hoek understands Clement’s
immense use and citation of materials—thousands of citations ranging from biblical materials,
early Christian writings, and “the whole span of Greek literature from Homer to his own time”—
as better characterized by the term “recycled material,” as opposed to “borrowing.”118 “Recycled”
over “borrowed” better illustrates a world in which many of Clement’s citations were ubiquitous
for those of his social positioning as well implying the ways in which “he subtly or unsubtly
transforms his borrowed material.”119 In these ways, Clement and his co-workers are able to make
Christians both the subjects of and heirs to scriptural promises, as well as to Greco-Roman
philosophical traditions.120

The Clementine Logos: The Good Educator, Wisdom Himself, the Word of the Father
Returning to the importance of the Christ/Logos and Clement’s understanding of the relationship
between Christ—as Educator, Word, and Wisdom—and His ekklēsia, the designation Paedagogus
itself carries the breadth of his Christology. Citing Paul, Clement writes that if “‘the Law has been
given . . . as our educator in Christ.’ Then it is obvious that the one person who is alone reliable,
just, good, Jesus, the Son of the Father as His image and likeness, the Word of God, is our
Educator.”121 This demonstrates that he understood all true teaching as flowing from the
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Christ/Logos, the original and only inherently authorized transmitter of knowledge, leaving the
Christian teacher to stand “in the place of Christ pointing to perfection and knowledge.”122 Thus
he sees the primary responsibility of the Christian teacher being to interpret, expound upon, and
explain the difficulties found within scripture and tradition.123 He takes up this task and in doing
so, builds—through thousands of citations—an idealized “Christian” identity, composed of
lengthy admonishments and prescribed behaviors, in addition to specifying that which the
“Christian” is not; these would be, to name but a few: vain, self-indulgent, fornicating, gluttonous,
greedy, and all things ethnikos.124
In Clement’s view there was an “initial transmission of true knowledge from the divine to
the human realms,” through the Christ/Logos inheriting this knowledge as the Son of God the
Father, and that “any claim to legitimacy entails a claim to unilateral descent through ‘fathers’ who
have passed on the essence of the original Father.”125 His Christ/Logos is a didactic deity who was
already revealed in philosophy and scripture—perceivable through the reasoning mind—and who
historically incarnated as a human, not as “an ontological, but a pedagogical necessity.”126 And it
is “active” in that it “forcibly draws men from their natural worldly way of life and educates them
to the only true salvation: faith in God. That is to say, the heavenly Guide, the Word, once He
begins to call men to salvation, takes to Himself the name of persuasion.”127
He understands the Christ/Logos as the only true teacher and pedagogue: the only one who
can instruct “the little ones” in matters of salvation and assumed human flesh in order to do so.
Any claim to being able to instruct in this manner, must also be able to claim continuity with this
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initial transmission of true knowledge. But this begs the question, what is the end goal of this
transmission for Clement—and thus the importance of establishing a Christian identity in the first
place? Salvation through deification is Clement’s answer and despite his polemics against his
contemporaries who “dare to call themselves perfect and Gnostics,” he constructed a similar
understanding of salvation to many of his opponents.128
He connects this deification-as-salvation with “the original divine command” in Genesis
1:26, writing: “it seems to me that the reason that He formed man from dust with His own hands,
gave him a second birth through water, increase through the Spirit, education by the Word . . . was
precisely that He might transform an earth-born man into a holy and heavenly creature by His
coming, and accomplish the original divine command: ‘Let us make mankind in our image and
likeness.’”129 For Clement, the entire revelatory and pedagogical history of the Christ/Logos is
seen through this lens of deification and fulfillment of Genesis 1:26, ending with the assimilation
of humans into the Christ/Logos.130 The overarching thrust of Clement’s understanding of true
wisdom is that following the instructions of the Christ/Logos necessitates “disciplining the body
and subduing the passions,” in order to achieve salvation through deification and transcend the
flesh: “the true human soars to its heavenly home.”131 Litwa classifies this as a “platonizing
metanarrative” or “micromyth,” which further demonstrates the complexity—and indebtedness to
Greek literature—of Clement’s articulation of continuity, deification, and authority.132
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Legitimacy and Appeals to the Scriptural Past
Throughout the Paedagogus, Clement quotes from Hebrew Scriptures—most often Sirach and
Proverbs—the Pauline epistles, Philonic materials, and from a plethora of pagan authors, which
range “from Plato and the Stoics, Homer and the dramatists, and occasionally, Pindar, Herodotus,
and the poets.”133 In her in-depth investigation of Clement’s vast repository of citations, Hoek
notes that Clement is often read as “obscure,” in part due to a constant tendency on his part to
digress toward other writers with references and quotations.134 According to Otto Stählin’s index
of Clementine citations, the Alexandrian writer’s extant works contain 1,273 Pauline and 618
Platonic borrowings, 279 references to Philonic materials, and 243 citations of Homer.135 But
while this may present as “obscure,” it is crucial for Clement and his understanding of identity to
draw from all available sources in demonstrating the antiquity and authority of his claims.
Clement, as meandering and murky as he may be, is a master when it comes to citing his sources
and in doing so, he authorizes and lays the concrete foundations for his conception of “Christian”
identity, which he is then easier able to define.
This is certainly the case with his citations of Plato and other Greek “pagan” writers, in
whom he traces the descent of the Christ/Logos as well. However, the primary importance of his
extensive citations is that they establish the connection between his teaching and the earliest
moments of interaction between the Christ/Logos and humankind, which are found in the Hebrew
Scriptures. Clement reads his understanding of the Word as Educator into every interaction
between humankind and the divine; whether it be Moses, Isaiah, Hosea, Jeremiah, the apostles, or
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even the kings, Solomon and David, all true knowledge is merely expressed through them.136 This
is the tradition he places himself in when he assumes the authoritative role of instructing “the little
ones.” Without explicitly claiming that the Christ/Logos speaks “through” him—in the exact
language he uses in regard to figures of the past, both scriptural and Greek—Clement constructs a
continuity between himself, his ekklēsia and these figures through the continued pedagogical
presence of the Christ/Logos, thereby presenting himself in the role of living instructor and
mouthpiece.
Again, it is important to reiterate that Clement was not acting without precedent in his
reconstruction of a past that authorizes his present authority. In fact, he was engaged in the same
“contest for respect and recognition” as his contemporaries, and like the Jewish and Christian
writers of the time, “had the advantage of a long but highly idiosyncratic historiographical
tradition, or at least a tradition that could be configured as historiographical,” in scripture, which
is “both a model and a resource for subsequent rememberings.”137 Prior to Clement’s literary
constructions of Christian identity, Josephus, Philo, and many others had worked to realign and
maintain a sense of Jewish identity in the ever-evolving social circumstances of the Roman world,
always drawing from scripture which is itself “the expression of, and the consequence of, a process
by which a coherent remembering of a common past and of a shared experience of divine presence
has been forged out of the inchoate multiple pasts, largely lost to us, of disparate peoples.”138
Just how embedded he was in the intellectual milieu of his age must be stressed, as Hoek
does when she brings attention to the fact that even when quoting from scripture, Clement draws
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from the direct quotations of other commentators, such as Philo.139 Clement’s erudition means that
no matter what material he is handling, including scripture, he is dealing with it through layers of
commentary and philosophic experimentation, allowing him to “focus on a biblical passage but to
include phrases of the author he is consulting as a kind of wrapping material, so that some of their
words remain attached to biblical quotations.”140 This multi-layered usage of material
demonstrates how thoroughly he is rooted in the social and literary worlds of elite, Greek-speaking
intellectuals of the second century Roman Empire, as even when he is dealing with more ancient
materials, these “wrappings” color his work and serve to emphasize his authority.

The Specter of Paul: A Contested Legacy of People-Language
Despite Clement’s vast repertoire of reference, citation, and justification, he has an obvious
favorite, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and that is, as Hoek puts it, “by quite a wide margin,
good old Saint Paul.”141 Clement was not alone in his overwhelming preference toward Paul, and
John David Penniman, referencing 1 Corinthians 3, asks the question: “What kind of meal did the
children of Paul make of his words?”142 The short answer is “a contentious one.”
Pointing to how food was “encoded with the power to communicate and convey a cultural
essence,” Penniman argues that “interpreters in no way received the apostle’s milk as a single,
coherent mode of ‘Christian knowledge’ or ‘Christian identity’ . . . indeed, the meals made of
Paul’s words reveal a startlingly divergent range of options for how one could be well-fed and
well-formed in Christ.”143 The apostle and his writings were contested ground in the second
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century, and much like claiming descent from or inheritance of a scriptural past granted legitimacy,
appealing to Paul—as another widely-recognized human agent of the Christ/Logos—reinforced
that legitimacy and thus the Pauline epistles were a site of conflict for many competing
constructors of identity among early Christians.
Clement engages actively by citing Paul often and using his words in order to set and
reinforce the boundaries of Christian identity and what is permissible and advisable for a member
of his ekklēsia. Often when speaking of “the new people, the assembly of little ones,” Clement
justifies his preference toward metaphors of childhood—in keeping with the overarching theme of
the Paedagogus—by citing Paul and asserting that this “new people” are “amenable as a child,”
or “in the sense of new-born children of God, purified of uncleanness and vice.”144 It also is from
the Pauline epistles that Clement inherits a “three-fold” distinction between peoples—Jews,
Greeks or Gentiles, and Christians or “little ones”—which only finds “its embryonic form in
Paul . . . and more explicit articulation in Clement.”145 Scholars such as Buell, Caroline Johnson
Hodge and David G. Horrell have gone to great lengths to demonstrate that Paul, Clement, and
other Christians of the first centuries did not invent a “new” sense of identity which contrasted
with and transcended the fixed ethnic categories of their contemporaries, but rather described
“‘Christian’ identity in the same terms as those other competing people-groupings, the terms
standardly used to organize the social world.”146
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Pleading the Cause of Hellenism
When it comes to his use of non-Christian and non-Jewish literature, “Clement is a typical
representative of the Hellenistic-Roman tradition,” in that he “compares closely with other
‘bookworms’ such as Plutarch and Eusebius, both separated from Clement (in opposite directions)
by a century.”147 Clement often cites this literature, because he understands the Christ/Logos as
present in Greek, non-Jewish wisdom. He quotes the Homeric phrase, “the word flows sweeter
than honey,” and adds that it “is said, I believe, of the Word who is also honey, for the inspired
word so often praises Him ‘above honey and the honeycomb.”148 In this way, Clement is able to
see the echoes of Psalm 19 in Homer and the presence of the Christ/Logos in both, demonstrating
the obscured, pre-Incarnation, pedagogical role that it played in Greek wisdom. This is consistent
with his understanding that the Word “teaches all things, and uses all things to educate us.”149
In further articulating the role of the Christ/Logos among pre-Incarnation Greeks, and
subsequently Jews, Clement writes that some educated Greeks knew God “not by positive
knowledge, but by indirect expression,” in order that “those from the Hellenic training and also
from the law who accept faith are gathered into the one race (genos) of the saved people (laos):
not that the three peoples are separated by time, so that one might suppose [they have] three
different natures, but trained in different covenants of the one Lord.”150 Here we can see Clement’s
interpretation of the pedagogical role played by the Christ/Logos prior to the Incarnation, revealing
divine wisdom through “Hellenic training and also from the law.”
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Yet, the hearers of this wisdom would have been unable to fully imbibe its meaning—
without the Incarnation—and this leaves Plato and other Greek philosophers to point “the direction
for those setting out on an unknown road.”151 In constructing his authorizing sense of continuity,
Clement, like many early Christians who had received a Greek education, argued that Plato read
and was influenced by the teachings of Moses and was thus able to reconcile his faith and his
indebtedness to Greek philosophy by inscribing Plato into the patrilineage which originated with
the Christ/Logos.152
When describing un-adornment and simplicity in clothing for Christian men, Clement cites
Plato referring to him as “the man who in his teaching follows Moses, Plato, excellent in every
way.”153 Not only does he put forth the assertion that Plato knew of and followed Moses’ teachings,
but he even goes so far as to write: “he who of all philosophers so praised truth, Plato, gave new
life to the dying ember of Hebrew philosophy” and that he “echoes the Word.”154 As Osborn
demonstrates, Clement was “as deeply convinced of the world-view of Plato and Greek culture as
he was of his Christian faith,” but it is important not to set up a false dichotomy here, no matter
how strongly our terminology insists upon it.155 Even for a writer who understood himself as
“borrowing” from Greek wisdom, Clement himself found in this imagined link between Moses
and Plato, a way to fully incorporate Greek wisdom into the lineage of the Christ/Logos and
thereby situate Plato among the teachers and vessels which the Christ/Logos operates through. He
writes that “philosophy was given to the Greeks . . . to bring the Hellenic mind, as the law, the
Hebrews, to Christ. Philosophy, therefore, was a preparation, paving the way for him who is
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perfected in Christ.”156 Eloquently summing up Clement’s readings of Greek literature, Litwa
writes: “Clement hears the song of the Logos in Homer, but also the siren song of adultery and
idolatry.”157
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III. The Other
The Necessity of the Other
According to Lieu’s model of identity, “the presence of the other pervades almost any question
about identity,” but while true, I find it necessary to further emphasize the importance of “the
other” by arguing that it is impossible to define the self and “us” without—advertently or
inadvertently—describing the other and the “them.”158 We cannot talk about who we are, either
individually or collectively, without talking about who we are not. If Clement identifies with a
“new people,” then there must be an old people or multiple old peoples.159 When he composes—
or potentially quotes—an early Christian hymn, identifying his community as the “undefiled, pure
flock,” he assumes an opposing group of the “defiled.”160 And in asserting that there exists a “we”
who follow Christ, he establishes a “they” “who do not follow Christ.”161 The question of “the
other” is inextricably tied to the question of “the self,” and neither identity can exist without its
counterpart and equal constructor. If we understand this, only then can we fully appreciate Lieu’s
assertion that:
Identity develops only in social interaction; the sense of those outside the
boundaries, whose claims to the same history and Scriptures are denied, whose
practice is excoriated, who embody the ‘other’ over against whom ‘we’ are defined,
who represent a way of being that ‘we’ have left behind, has pervaded every
chapter. So encountered, the ‘other’ is herself or himself constructed by
opposition.162
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Clement, among other authors, contributed to constructing the categories that would eventually be
reified through apologetics and even modern scholarship as “pagans,” “Jews,” and “heretics”
through caricatured descriptions of these “others” whose primary purposes were to contrast “the
Christian.”163 However, in understanding the dynamic nature of interaction and development in
identity, we cannot assume a purely combative relationship with all “others” that existed alongside,
intersected with, and occasionally overlapped with Clement’s ekklēsia, and instead we must attend
to “the other ‘others’ who, at times within the texts and perhaps more frequently behind them, are
also engaged in more conciliatory dialogue . . . whispers of other lives lived according to the divine
logos . . . [which points] to alternative patterns of relationship.”164 This will become important in
subsequent discussions of “Christian” interactions with other people-groups, not limited to the
Jewish and Christian others, but even to those we now anachronistically term “pagan,” especially
for an author such as Clement.

Mapping Onto an Existing Background
Again it must be emphasized that Christians did not emerge onto the scene as outsiders, but rather
cultivated a “new” sense of identity among existing identities and using established patterns of
identity and identity-language. The emergence of a Greek “ethnic identity” in the fifth century
BCE has been extensively studied and I am in agreement with Lieu that “Christian rhetoric of
identity, even when making universalist claims, is articulated in the terms also used in GraecoRoman ethnography and identity formation.”165 The specific terms—primarily ethnos, genos, and
laos—are kept and the construction of “Christian” identities are mapped onto existing patterns by
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the types of arguments made by Clement and his contemporaries, which often differentiate peoples
according to practice. Specifically in regard to Clement, this can be seen when he distinguishes
Christians as “we, who worship [God] in a new way, in the third way, are Christians.”166
When considering self and group identification, the vast majority of ancient people did not
find themselves within a static or unchanging environment, but a dynamic and vibrant one, which
“was categorized by significant diversity, resulting from colonization, migration, travel, and
war.”167 We cannot ignore this embeddedness or make special exception for Christians through
the assumption that early Christian writers were speaking metaphorically while all of their
opponents and neighbors spoke literally, as this ignores the fact that ancient Christians were, in
fact, not outsiders or some form of otherworldly colonizers, completely unfamiliar with the world
which produced them. Clement, taken as an example, was thoroughly enmeshed into the
particularities of the cultural and social roles that accompanied being an educated, Greek,
Alexandrian at the end of the second century.
“Ethnoracial difference” was an established pattern of how ancient Mediterranean peoples
at the time understood religious practices; early Christians were not exempt from this, but rather
mapped their own identities onto preexisting frameworks that they possessed as inhabitants of this
world.168 Buell demonstrates this in pointing out that “Egyptians were especially ridiculed and
critiqued by Romans, Greeks, and Jews alike for their religious practices—veneration of animals
in particular . . . Greeks condemned Persians not only for alleged immorality but also for illicit
religious practices, notably magic . . . Jews condemned their gentile contemporaries on religious
grounds, as idolators . . . [and] Christians defined themselves fully within these conventions.”169
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This can be seen when Clement orders his readers to “not worship . . . as the Hellenes . . . neither
worship as the Jews,” but in his new, third way: as Christians.170 Religious practice and ethnic
belonging are not separate, but rather joined in that the former is a vital part in constructing the
latter. Clement defines “Christians” within this framework and using its terminology.
A common pitfall of modern scholarship here is the recurring assumption that, aside from
understanding Jesus as Christ, “Christianness is most often distinguished from Jewishness in
ethnoracial terms: [that] ‘Christianity lacked the ethnic links of Judaism.’”171 Yet, this assumption
obscures the way that ancient categories of ethnos and genos were utilized and glosses over the
diversity of ancient Jewish identities in order to paint Christianness as universal—i.e. superior—
and Jewishness as particular—inferior. But in the first few centuries CE, “neither Christianness
nor Jewishness corresponded to a clear, unified social formation or ideological conception . . .
[and] their relationship to one another was dynamic and often blurry.” 172 Despite what Clement
and his contemporaries have argued in their constructions of a Jewish “other,” we should avoid
broad and uncritical statements about the ethnoracial particularities of ancient Judaism,
particularly when there are “decidedly ‘universalistic’ elements present in some ancient
representations of Jewishness.”173
The understanding of early Christianity as a universalizing movement that broke with
ethnoracial identification and thereby rejected the particularism of its Jewish roots is problematic
for multiple reasons.174 Aside from concerns over Christian supersessionism and claims to
superiority, it not only undermines the diversity of ancient Jewish self-identification, but also
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overstates the supposed “non-ethnic” rhetoric of early Christian writers. It is important for modern
scholars of early Christianity, who largely agree that “early Christianity was marked by its
heterodoxy [and] pluralism,” not to simply set this pluralism “alongside the equally pluralistic
Judaism and paganism but [to understand] that it intersects with them.”175
It is certainly true that early Christians often denied ethnic particularism, but it is also true
that they repeatedly adopted the same terminology and “strategies of ethnic identity” as their
neighbors to make similar claims.176 This can both be seen above in Clement’s articulation of
Christian identity in terms of practice—contrasting with Greek and Jewish identities, but utilizing
the same parameters—and throughout his writings where he is particularly attached to the word
genos when articulating “Christian” identity as a people-group. He employs it numerous times in
his writings, claiming that Christians are “the chosen race,” “the elect race,” and the “the royal
race.”177
As Lieu argues, these identities—Christian, Jew, Greek, Roman, etc.—are not “the same
sort of thing . . . indeed, none of them is only one sort of thing. They are not necessarily mutually
incompatible, although they may on occasion be so constructed . . . neither are any of them
intrinsically oppositional, although this, too, is how they could be constructed.” 178 Viewing early
Christians as somehow divorced from the social, linguistic, and cultural networks that constructed
ancient identities serves no other purpose than to anachronistically portray early Christianity as a
uniquely universalizing and superior ancient people-group, which lifts its constructors out of their
own world.
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With this in mind, we should reject the binaries of “universal-particular” and “religiousethnic” as inappropriate when investigating ancient identity language. Modern presumptions about
the immutability of ethnicity and race can often cloud scholarship and lead to an understanding
that early Christians were “nonracial,” simply because of the acquired nature of their identity, as
if that were unique to them or that acquisition and ethnicity were mutually exclusive concepts.179
In Clement’s positioning of Christians as a “third” genos, he is practicing “ethnic reasoning,”
which was, Buell notes, an often used tool in order to “argue that individuals need to transform
themselves . . . into members of a saved, righteous, immovable, or true genos, a holy or special
laos.”180
This runs against the often ubiquitous understanding that Christianity “as a movement”
broke the “conventional embeddedness of religion in society and politics,” and was exempt from
the ethnoracial framework that was endemic to the language surrounding religious practice in
Clement’s world.181 This is an understanding that presupposes that ethnoracial identity and
“universalizing rhetoric” could not exist in tandem, which Buell firmly rejects, in favor of arguing
that “saying that Christianity is open to all people is not mutually exclusive with defining
Christians as members of an ethnoracial group.”182
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The Third Genos: The One Saved Race
“We are the children. Scripture mentions us very often and in many different ways, and refers to
us under different titles . . . at times, He calls us children, at other times, chick, sometimes, little
ones, here and there sons, and very often offspring, a new people, a young people.”183
In the above quote, Clement not only demonstrates the importance of continuity—through reading
the people-group of “Christians” backwards into Hebrew scriptures—but also claims the mantle
of a “new people,” which necessarily constructs an “old people.”184 He does not leave this implicit,
but rather claims that “the old people were perverse and hard of heart, but we, the new people, the
assembly of little ones, are amenable as a child.”185 The language of childhood here emphasizes
the Christ/Logos as Educator, who Christians are able to understand—and be educated by—in
light of the Incarnation, Crucifixion, and Resurrection, but who non-Christians misunderstand
through lack of faith and Christian others misunderstand in the absence of a continuity with the
apostles, and thereby with the Christ/Logos itself.
In identifying Christians as “the chosen/elect/royal race,” the “one race of the saved
people,” and as those who “worship . . . in the third way (τρίτῳ γένει),” Clement utilizes the
standard terminology of his Greek-speaking contemporaries in defining people-groups.186 This
shows that despite his claims to universality through faith, ethnoracial membership and religious
practice are still joined in Clement’s thought and demonstrates that he utilizes the universal claims
of Christianity “in order to ground his claim that Christian worship—as he defines it—is the only
true form of religion.”187 For Clement, the historical Incarnation of the Christ/Logos brought with
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it the chance for all humankind—which had previously misunderstood God’s wisdom—to be
restored in the form of this third race. This, once again, ties back into the role of the Christ/Logos
as Educator, whose Incarnation was necessary precisely to correct the blind spots of Greek and
Jewish wisdom, present but misunderstood in philosophy and the Mosaic Law. The reason his
genos is superior is not that it is not a genos, but rather that it exists in order to erase the divides
caused by the “fragmentation of truth” and to restore and fulfill what was the “previously
unrealized potential in all humans.”188
Clement demonstrates this, when he writes that “those from the Hellenic training and also
from the law who accept faith are gathered into the one race (genos) of the saved people (laos):
not that the three people are separated by time, so that one might suppose [they have] three different
natures, but trained in different covenants of the one Lord.”189 As Buell writes:
Clement does not use this common ground to dissolve all the differences among
Hellenes, Jews, and Christians. Rather, he uses this common ground to define
Christians as a distinct people constituted out of former members of the Hellenes
and Jews. Christians are the genos of the saved . . . thus what we might conceive of
as a religious process, conversion, could be simultaneously imagined as a process
of ethnic transformation.190
Modern concepts of “religion” and “ethnicity” are not separable or oppositional for Clement, but
rather “mutually constituting;” Christians are both the superior—and singular—saved genos and
an identity that is universal to all, accessible through faith.191 There is no contradiction for him in
his understanding of Christians as a people and as potentially universal, precisely because he
utilizes the fluid categories of ethnos and genos with the connotations of his own time and not
ours. It is the universality of Clement’s third genos that establishes its superiority—as a genos—
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to other people-groups, whether contrasting the binaries of “Greeks and barbarians,” “Greeks and
Jews,” or “Jews and gentiles.”192

The Greek Other: The Ethnē
The embedded nature of Clement’s identity is well articulated by Laura Nasrallah, who writes that
“his second-century Protreptikos is launched to (and against) Greeks, even as it employs excellent
Greek and proudly displays great cultural sophistication.”193 It is precisely this “threat of
similarity,” that necessitates, for early Christian authors—and Clement in particular—the
construction of boundaries for a “Christian” identity among those who “find in the thought of
Greek philosophy more to join than to separate them.”194 These and other constructed boundaries,
and what each of them entails, will be further discussed in the next chapter, but for now it is
important to reemphasize the threat of similarity in the production of “the other.”
Distinguishing what “sort the pagans (ethnikos) are,” Clement finds it easiest to label them
simply as “they who do not follow Christ.”195 He divorces these ethnē from the tradition of Greek
philosophy by characterizing them as seeking “needless comforts, self-pampering, highly spiced
and rich foods” precisely due to their lack of understanding, which is only achievable through
accepting the Christ/Logos as Educator.196 Despite possessing the wisdom of the Educator in the
form of philosophy, they falter into worldliness without that understanding and are not granted the
same affection which Clement demonstrates towards Plato and other ancient Greeks who seemed
to—from his understanding—glean the presence of the Christ/Logos in philosophy.
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The ethnē and Clement’s attempts to separate them from his idea of “the Christian,” will
consume the majority of the final chapter, so I will not dwell on his complete characterization of
them here, except to say that they are first and foremost, characterized by a lack of restraint. In
condemning them and their perceived inclinations toward indulgence, he quotes Luke and adds his
own commentary:
‘Seek now what you shall eat or what you shall drink, and do not exalt yourselves.’
It is ostentatiousness, a false imitation of the truth and extravagance that exalts us
above and away from the truth; concentration on needless comforts also turns us
away from the truth. Therefore, He shrewdly adds: ‘After all these things, the
heathens seek.’ The heathen (ta ethnē) are they who are without discipline and
without understanding.197
He identifies the “these things,” which Christ refers to in Luke as “needless comforts, selfpampering, highly spiced and rich foods, gourmandizing, gluttony.”198

The Christian Other: “Gnostics falsely so-called”
Early Christian understandings of “the heretic” or “the Christian other”—and the explication of
whom might be placed within these groups—were important facets of a rhetoric that existed within
the process of this period of self-definition.199 In other words, Clement and his contemporaries
utilized the tools and language of their world to define themselves over and against “outsiders” of
all stripes; this constitutes what Lieu understands as an “act of power” and served to construct
these Christians as “others.”
While comparing the understandings of deification of Clement and the Naassene Writer,
Litwa notes that many so-called “gnostic” groups were threateningly similar to the communities
which would ultimately coalesce into the proto-orthodox church and that contemporaries “spared
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no effort in their rhetorical attempt to make them seem ‘other’ . . . [and that] it was the threat of
similarity that built the wall of (supposedly insurmountable) difference.”200 In Clement’s literary
constructions of a “Christian” identity that excludes the likes of Basilides of Alexandria,
Valentinus, Marcion and their followers, the issues arising from the theological differences and
distinct practices between the groups may have been “clear-cut in Clement’s eyes,” but his
opponents were “not always distinct or at a safe distance.”201
In constructing these “others,” Clement accuses them of being “puffed up in their own
knowledge” and daring “to call themselves perfect and Gnostics, [thereby] laying claim in their
inflated pride to a loftier state than the Apostle.”202 In accusing these opponents of an inflated
sense of pride—one which places them in opposition to Paul, no less—he asserts his right “to pass
on Christian tradition (in whatever form) over and against [these] Christian ‘others.’” 203 He does
this by accusing them of being unable to trace a patrilineage to the Christ/Logos or in claiming a
corrupted—even fabricated—lineage, thereby depriving them of an authoritative past.
In the Stromateis, Clement refers to Basilides, Valentinus, and Marcion as “founders,”
implying that they had merely invented their theological teachings, rather than inherited them
through a patrilineage which originated with the Christ/Logos.204 Additionally, he accuses both
Basilides and Valentinus of falsifying lineages, attempting to anchor themselves to Peter and Paul,
respectively. He writes that Basilides and his followers falsely claimed “Glaucias, the interpreter
of Peter,” as his teacher, and that Valentinus did the same with “Theodas, who was a disciple of
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Paul.”205 In denying these lineages, Clement places these Christian “others” outside of the
patrilineage of the apostles and in doing so, denies them any sense of authoritative teaching.
Having been neutralized and stripped a potentially dangerous authority, he then cautions
“the little ones” against these “others.” He writes that “if we, the children, protect ourselves from
the winds that blow us off our course into the pride of heresy and refuse to listen to those who set
up other fathers for us [i.e. non-apostles], we are made perfect by accepting Christ as our Head
and becoming ourselves the Church.”206 Clement never makes a sustained critique of these
Christian “others” in any of his surviving works, but he “regularly locates his own views in relation
to other Christian opinions,” and in this way, attends to that threat of similarity by othering these
opponents.207

The Jewish Other: The Hebraioi and the Ioudaioi
Contrasted with his repeated—if brief—criticisms of Christian followers of Valentinus, Basilides,
and other “gnostics falsely so-called,” “Clement has relatively little to say about contemporary
Jews and Jewishness.”208 Yet there are some references to the Hebraioi and the Ioudaioi
throughout Clement’s surviving writings and both terms are used to designate ancient and
contemporary descendants of Abraham, interchangeably.209 Whenever Clement cites the
exhortations made to Israel in the Septuagint, “he generally follows the practice of interpreting the
text as applicable to the ekklēsia of which he is a part,” identifying his community as “the true
Israel.”210 But when it comes to the “Hebrew people,” he identifies them as those responsible for
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the crucifixion of Christ and whose piety stems from hatred.211 He contrasts Hebrew piety with
Christian reverence, writing that the former “is mixed with hate: this is the way slaves feel toward
harsh masters, and the Hebrews when they looked on God as their Master and not their Father.”212
While typically utilizing the “native” term Hebraioi when citing Hebrew Scripture in the
Paedagogus, Clement makes three uses of Ioudaioi to castigate the ancient Hebrews and accuse
them of a “propensity toward indulgence.”213 His writings “lack the ferocity of contemporary
Adversus Iudaeos literature, [but] his use of the term Ioudaios has a critical edge.”214 Carleton
Paget understands this—comparative—lack of vitriol in regard to contemporary Jewish people
found, or rather not found, in Clement’s writings as due to the fact that—stemming from the
aftermath of the Jewish revolt under Trajan—he “did not face significant competition from
contemporaneous Jews . . . [and therefore] was not motivated by the same social historical contexts
as Christians elsewhere.”215
Clement was certainly not an example of early Christian tolerance towards Jews and he
possessed his own anti-Judaism, but the lack of influential Alexandrian Jewish opposition allowed
him to easily utilize Jewish philosophy and Scriptures—with clear supersessionist implications—
in his construction of Christian identity, without needing to excoriate a substantial or influential
group of local opponents.216 Whether differentiating themselves as a “new people,” or claiming a
rightful inheritance to Jewish Scriptural promises, the constructions of identity by early Christian
writers like Clement depended upon the existence of an othered group of Jews.
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When it comes to his understanding of his own community, Clement alludes to the Pauline
writings to argue that the differences between Jew and Greek within the ekklēsia have been erased
and that “the Christian is conceived of as a new creation, his former identity supplanted,” due to
the annulling effect of the Christ/Logos on “Jewishness” and “Greekness.”217 Additionally, he
makes reference to Paul as the Apostle who “was” a Hebrew and a Jew, but is no longer, a
distinction of identity that Paul himself did not explicitly make. 218 There is no understanding or
imagined possibility of a “Jewish-Christian” in Clement’s writings, instead he is explicit that
“when one becomes a Christian, one ceases to be a Ioudaios . . . [and that the Ioudaioi] do not have
the pistis or the saving gnosis of Christ.”219 For Clement, the Ioudaioi possess truth in the form of
the Law—like the Greeks did though philosophy—but are incapable of understanding it without
the guidance of the Christ/Logos.
Given the importance of continuity in identity formation, it should not be surprising that
early Christians “often make the claim, in various ways, that the movement of those following
Christ represents the true fulfillment of Jewish hopes and expectation such that what later comes
to be known as Christianity stands in some kind of continuity with—and makes a claim
regarding—the ancestral traditions of Judaism.”220 This is a repeated assertion of Clement who
writes that Paul “says that the Jews were heirs according to the Old Testament, but according to
the promise, we are,” and that “the suffering of the Lord, indeed, has filled us with its fragrance,
but the Hebrews with sin.”221
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Christian Self-Othering and Opposition to the World
Adding to these various ways of othering those “outside” of Clement’s ekklēsia is his participation
in the early Christian practice of self-othering, or “the recurring efforts towards the creation of a
sense of being themselves ‘other,’ of being strangers in the world.”222 This touches on the previous
three categories of “other” in that each of those are depicted in Clement’s writings as “worldly”
and firmly entrenched in blind wickedness, while his ekklēsia are “free and newly born, joyous in
our faith, holding fast to the course of truth, swift in seeking salvation, spurning and trampling
upon worldliness.”223 His idea of “the Christian” is that of the figure of a colt, “unyoked to evil,
unsubdued by wickedness, unaffected, high-spirited only with Him our Father,” whereas those he
others are stallions, “‘who whinny lustfully for their neighbor’s wife, beasts of burden unrestrained
in their lust.’”224
This process of self-othering and distinguishing “Christian” identity from the surrounding
world contributes to the aforementioned problems of scholars reading early Christians as universal,
otherworldly, and distinct from the world which they live in, but as previously demonstrated, this
was not the case. Rather, this perception stems from taking these authors out of their contexts and
accepting their self-proclaimed difference, without attention to the diversity among other ancient
people-groups and/or ignoring their claims to similar difference. When Clement writes that “we
have given up sin and the world, we tread the earth, although with light foot, only to the degree
that appearances demand, that we may be in this world,” we must question what it is, exactly that
he’s actually trying to accomplish.225
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Often he is critiquing a certain “libertinism that has become so rife in the cities, that [it has]
become the norm.”226 While this extends to all forms of “greed” and “gluttony,” he seems to be
primarily concerned with sexual ethics and the dangers of “lustful pleasure,” primarily pederasty,
adultery, incest, certain homosexual acts, and other forms of “violent sexual impulses.”227 The
details of these—and their implications for Clement’s understanding of “Christian” identity—will
be further explored in the next chapter, but for now it should be sufficient to note his passionate
condemnation of sexual immorality in writing:
Women live in brothels, there offering their own bodies for sale to satisfy lustful
pleasure, and boys are taught to renounce their own natures and play the role of
women. Self-indulgence has turned everything upside down. Over-refinement in
comfortable living has put humanity to shame. It seeks everything, it attempts
everything, it forces everything, it violates even nature. Men have become the
passive mate in sexual relations and women act as men; contrary to nature, women
now are both wives and husbands. No opening is impenetrable to impurity. Sexual
pleasure is made public property common to all the people, and self-indulgence
their boon companion. What a pitiful spectacle! What unspeakable practices! They
are the monuments to your widespread lack of self-control, and whores are the
proof of your deeds. Alas, such disregard for law!228
In summarizing the importance of this “other,” whether they be Jewish, Greek, Christian, or any
other manner of opponent which Clement terms “worldly,” it must be said once again that it is the
threat of similarity and the porousness of boundaries that necessitates the maintenance through
literary “othering” as an “act of power.” “The other” is necessary to define “the self” and in
Clement’s case, the danger of his own embeddedness in the elite literary world of the ancient
Mediterranean serves to amplify the totalizing language he uses in this process of definition.
Encapsulating this, Lieu writes that “wherever we look for the emergency of ‘the self’ there looms
the spectre of ‘the other’ . . . tracing the boundaries demands peering over to see what lies beyond,
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and asking why it (or ‘they’) must be excluded . . . naming and being named involves being named
as, or naming, those who are not ‘us.’”229
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IV. The Parameters
“What We Are to Do and What We Are to Avoid”
Clement’s own self-understanding casts him in the role of a moralist, as opposed to a teacher. A
fitting distinction for him, as he writes that the only true teacher is the Educator himself.230 And in
this role, he lays out a program of acceptable behaviors to serve as the parameters and identifiers
of “Christian” behavior, while asserting that he is not the source of these parameters of identity,
but rather that they stem from the Christ/Logos itself. He writes that “it is already evident what the
Educator desires and what He professes to accomplish, what He has in mind in His words and in
His deeds when He commands what we are to do and what we are to avoid.”231 It is the “what we
are to do and what we are to avoid,” which will comprise the core of this chapter and the outline
of Clement’s “Christian” identity.
Repeatedly throughout the Paedagogus, Clement returns to the idea of “the way we should
regulate our actions” in order to “describe the sort of life he who is called a Christian should
live.”232 A professed belief is not enough for Clement to admit someone into the ranks of “the
Christian.” Rather, he understands “Christianness” as something which must be performed and
embodied through behaviors and social relations.
Turning from Clement’s depiction of who is not a Christian—“the other”—although not
entirely leaving it behind, I now turn to examining the regimen of embodied actions that he
prescribes for all Christians to perform. These actions constitute “the boundary” of Clement’s
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Christian identity. In this discussion it is necessary to heed Lieu’s reminder that “the language of
boundary is, of course, the language of metaphor,” and unable to fully capture the lived realities
of Clement’s readers and their social environment.233 The actions and avoidances Clement calls
for constitute a “boundary” in a more concrete manner, but it is important to remember that it exists
in this form only as a literary construction. In practice, these distinctions were characterized by
fluidity, exchange, and porousness.
As embodied in the lived experiences of his contemporaries, Clement’s “boundary” is
closer to Lieu’s “frontier” as an area of mutual exchange, crossing, and uncomfortable interaction,
rather than his own stark border between “the little ones” and “the unclean who, like swine, revel
in bodily pleasures and filthy habits of life and impure delights, itching for evil-minded pleasures
of sex.”234 Along with his subtle references to the inevitability of mixed dining, conversation,
bathing, and other forms of social interaction between Christians and non-Christian Greeks, this
porousness is displayed in his own words. Throughout the Paedagogus, Clement oscillates
between condemning the behavior and character of those he labels “ethnē” and then immediately
citing philosophers, dramatists, and other writers who would—if the absence of faith in Christ is
truly the requirement—fall within the boundaries of those same ethnē. This demonstrates that the
edges of identity are permeable, dynamic, and encouraging of interaction and exchange, even
“while providing rules for it; they are not merely defensive but also allow for trade.”235
Lieu writes that “if identity implies a sameness constituted by continuity”—explored in the
first chapter—“it also demands difference”—the “other” of the preceding chapter—“and between
the two stands a boundary.”236 Without these literary boundaries, the constructors of identity
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cannot define the “us” nor exclude the “them” in a coherent and competent manner. It is this
boundary which allows writers such as Clement to “safeguard against contamination or invasion—
or so it seems.”237 In practice, this literary border operates as a porous frontier where exchange
and interaction must be constantly regulated to maintain the idea of identity as a marker of
distinction. This is Lieu’s theory of identity as process. She writes:
Despite the comfortable feel of changelessness behind the idea of boundaries, as
equally behind that of the sameness of identity, we have to speak of process, of a
dynamic that sometimes, but for a while, may appear to achieve closure . . . a
process that is generated by the interaction of individuals and that does not simply
act as a constraint upon them . . . boundaries [that] are not ‘given’ but are produced
and reproduced.238

Crossing the Boundary: Becoming the Third Genos
Having already discussed the nature of Clement’s third genos as the most authentic expression of
humanity, it is important here only to reassert the permeability of the border and to emphasize that
Clement does state that it is faith in the Christ/Logos and the Incarnation that allows entrance into
this “race.” And it was Christ himself who set this division by his saving act. “We have the Cross
of the Lord as our boundary line, and by it we are fenced around and shut off from our former
sins,” Clement writes, both asserting a clear dividing line between Christians and non-Christians—
and with their “former sins” which the very existence of the Paedagogus as moral instruction
implies are not fully “former”—and also allowing a level of fluidity that welcomes conversion and
boundary crossing.239 This language of transformation is necessary for Clement to achieve his task
of outlining a new and distinct identity that is both essential and attainable, a pre-existing exemplar
and a newly attainable status.
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When he instructs his readers not to worship “as the Greeks” nor “as the Jews,” but “in the
third way (τρίτῳ γένει),” Clement is utilizing the language of both “fixity” and “fluidity.”240 Using
the dative, neuter, singular of genos to describe this distinction of practice demonstrates the
inseparability of “ethnoracial” belonging and “religious” practice in Clement’s social and
linguistic context. In this “admonition against the religious practices of the other kinds of humans
[emphasis added],” he shows that membership in a genos—“Christian” or not—is dependent upon
embodied practices.241
In Buell’s terminology, Clement is stressing ethnic fluidity when he speaks about “crossing
the threshold from outsider to insider as the assumption of a new ethnoracial identity” and focuses
on “boundaries—how they are crossed [and] of what they consist.”242 This is a crucial aspect of
Clement’s understanding of Christian identity as the pinnacle of “humanness.” In the Stromateis,
he again asserts the importance of faith in crossing this boundary, writing: “This great change, that
a person passes from unfaith to faith and comes to faith through hope and fear, comes from
God.”243 Throughout his surviving writings he alternates between using the language of fixity and
fluidity, presenting them as “unproblematically fluid,” because for Clement, the most authentic
expression of humanity was to be found in “conversion from love of finery [to] suffering borne
patiently for the Lord . . . [and in] unloosing the old vanity by the new faith.”244 He understands
faith in the Christ/Logos to lead the fallen human into their “true”—i.e. divinely intended—genos,
a category that is both universal and particular, preexisting and new.
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As described in the first chapter of this thesis, Clement understands deification to be the
ultimate fulfillment of the Christ/Logos’ pedagogical role in human life. Now, I would add on to
this that he sees faith as embodied through practice—“what we are to do and what we are to
avoid”—as the only way to manifest this status. This allows him to use the “fixed” terminology of
ethnoracial belonging in the same manner as his non-Christian contemporaries, while also
asserting a more “fluid” essence in his “Christian” identity, in that it is open to all through
conversion. In the midst of a consideration of lavishness and greed, he writes that “it is God
Himself who has brought our race to possession in common, by sharing Himself, first of all, and
by sending His Word to all men alike, and by making all things for all.”245 Ignoring—for the
moment—his condemnation of a love of luxury, here Clement shows this “fixity-fluidity” dialectic
in that while “Christians” constitute a distinct genos, it is a category that is explicitly open to all.
His use of fixed ethnoracial language does not contradict or pose a problem for his philosophical
thrust in the direction of universalism. Neither does the requirement of faith diminish the necessity
of distinguishing actions.
Returning to the idea of “the frontier” as opposed to an impermeable and concrete “border,”
it is important to reemphasize that the distinction between “Christian” and “non-Christian” was
more fluid in the second century than has typically been comfortable for scholars to admit. Lieu
characterizes the boundaries of the church in the second century as “frontiers under both
construction and contention, at times rather more a potentially well-populated, perhaps transient,
no-man’s land, where movement and connectedness is at least as common as separation.”246
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An Ethic of Restraint and an Ethnos of Indulgence
Toward the end of the Paedagogus, Clement describes his work as “treating only of the things
proper to our education, stressing the life Christians should live, in general outline.”247 And giving
a precis of “the life of the Christian,” he sums it up as “a united whole made up of deeds controlled
by reason.”248 He defines “Christianness” through behaviors and actions, which were prescribed
for us by the Christ/Logos in its role as Educator, both through Greek philosophy and Hebrew
Scripture, and made explicit in the Incarnation, Crucifixion, and Resurrection. This is his “reason”
and it is best demonstrated in the virtue of self-restraint, which Clement goes through great lengths
to establish as the truest indicator of Christian identity.
Immediately after claiming “the Cross of the Lord as our boundary line,” Clement exhorts
Christians to: “Let us be born again, then, and be nailed to the Cross in truth; let us return to our
senses and be sanctified . . . Good order is the perfect way of life, for it is entirely well behaved, it
is a quality that establishes constancy, fulfills virtuously in deed the things imposed on it, one after
the other, and is unsurpassed in virtue.”249 There are two important points to note here. The first is
Clement’s language that describes a conversion of faith as “returning” and being “sanctified,”
utilizing both the imagery of boundary-crossing and of reaching the fulfillment of human potential
in the “Christian way of life.” The second is the focus on “good order” as the mode of operation
for the Christian, who differentiates themselves from their non-Christian peers through deeds and
well-ordered actions. Taking the opposite approach—definition by repudiation—Clement writes
that “the Christian way of life is not achieved by self-indulgence,” but rather through “self-restraint
[which] is pure and simple . . . [and keeping] a man’s life innocent and free of shameful deeds.”250
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Keeping with his understanding of a three-part Revelation—through philosophy, Scripture,
and Christ—Clement traces this ethic of self-restraint to “the man who in his teaching followed
Moses, Plato, excellent in every way.”251 This is uniquely interesting, because while Clement uses
this ethic to draw the starkest line between Christians and “the other,” he repeatedly appeals to
non-Christian figures to do so. Before revisiting this, it is necessary to briefly demonstrate how
Clement’s ethic of self-restraint works as a boundary line in his thought and who this boundary
excludes.
Supporting the hypothesis that Clement faced no significant/influential Jewish opposition
in Alexandria due to the conflict during the reign of Trajan, he usually speaks of the Hebraioi and
the Ioudaioi in the past tense as either an ancient people whose history is detailed in Scripture or
as those responsible for the Crucifixion.252 While there are exceptions, such as the present
description of the effects of the “suffering of the Lord,” which have “filled us with its fragrance,
but the Hebrews with sin,” there is an overall lack of focus on contemporary Jewish identities.253
This can be seen when he writes that “this is the sort the pagans [ethnikos] are, of no account. It is
they who do not follow Christ.”254 With the decline of a prominent Jewish-Christian movement,
the vast majority of Jews would also fall under the umbrella of “they who do not follow Christ,”
but he is largely unconcerned with them throughout. Instead, he goes into much greater detail and
to condemn a different people-group, one whose differences with “Christians” are much more
pressing for Clement; it is this group that he terms, the ethnē.
For Clement, the most prevalent examples of a lack of self-restraint are to be found in the
ethnē, not contemporary Jews. Aside from his critiques of their behaviors, Clement is not explicit
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as to exactly who these ethnē are, but he at times links them to Greco-Roman deities, such as Zeus,
Hera, Artemis, Aphrodite, and Bacchus.255 We can conclude that they were a diverse and eclectic
mixture of groups and individuals with varying—often syncretic—beliefs, practices, philosophies,
statuses, and roles in society, which escape easy classification but are often lumped together under
the term “pagan.” Despite this diversity, Clement easily uses the “ethnic” term to describe those
“pagans (ethnōn)” who walk “in dissipation, lusts, drunkenness, revelings, carousings and
unlawful worship of idols.”256 If Christians are to be the third genos, then their most prevalent
opponents must fill one of the remaining “ethnic” categories. And if self-restraint is the core of a
Christian identity, then, in Clement’s eyes, drunken and lustful reveling is the core of an ethnikos
identity and exactly the sort of behavior which Christians are to avoid. He goes to great lengths to
instruct his readers not to emulate the behaviors of these “others,” who are without self-restraint
and the guidance of the Christ/Logos, writing:
We keep in mind these holy words particularly: ‘Keep your conduct excellent
among the heathens (ethnesin), so that, whereas they slander you as evil-doers, they
may, by observing the nobility of your actions, glorify God’ . . . Away with all
fornication! ‘Know this well,’ the Apostle says, ‘that no fornicator or unclean
person or covetous one (who is an idolater), has any inheritance in the kingdom of
Christ and God.’ But these women who delight in the company of perverts are
surrounded by a whole crowd of loose-tongued catamites, foul of body, foul of
speech, grown into manhood only to satisfy their lusts, agents of adultery,
guffawing and whispering, then indecently snorting out some suggestive sound
from their nostrils, trying to entertain with obscene words and gestures, stimulating
everyone to giddiness, the precursor of fornication.257
For Clement, the lack of self-restraint is the precursor to adultery, fornication, and all manner of
other obscenity which threatens to make his “Christians” indistinguishable from the othered ethnē.
Lieu implies this threat—albeit in less moralizing terms—when she notes that in the second
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century some Christian writers “began to discover that the boundary with ‘the Gentiles’ also
provides room for both negotiation and connectedness.”258 This is both a point of appreciation and
one of shame for Clement, who prefers not to acknowledge any such “connectedness” outside of
the terminology of a threatening “other,” and yet fills his work with quotes and references to the
same philosophers that his opponents claim.
Once again delaying Clement’s appeals to these ancient writers, it is important to first look
to his quotation of Paul to understand the extent of the difference between his “Christians” and his
“ethnē.” Criticizing those who lack self-restraint, Clement writes that they are “carnal” and “like
the pagans (ethnē), they still ‘mind the things of the flesh.’”259 To be “carnal,” he adds, means that
those who are “like the pagans,” “think, love, desire, seek, [and] are angry and envious over the
things of the flesh.”260 Using the apostle’s words—to condemn the “carnal” and those who “mind
the things of the flesh”—Clement wields his legitimacy, and the authority he grants himself
through this citation, to warn fellow Christians away from being “like the pagans.”
He continues, writing: “the heathen (ethnē) are they who are without discipline and without
understanding.”261 Here, Clement associates a lack of discipline with a lack of understanding and
thus, his ethic of self-restraint with a discerning faith in the Christ/Logos. He leaves no room for a
reader to fall in the middle, or outside of, or in some other uncomfortable position between these
two poles. His boundary—placing a morally suspect and undisciplined people on one side and a
restrained and orderly people on the other—was obviously not demonstrated in the behavior of
every non-Christian Greek and every Christian in the manner which Clement desired—who
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inhabited a lived “frontier”—but it is an important contrast when trying to understand the nature
of his ideal “Christian.”
Finally returning to Clement’s ubiquitous indebtedness to Greek philosophy, we need to
note that Clement is deeply immersed in the philosophy of the ethnē—which belongs to him as
much as it does to Celsus, Porphyry, or Libanius of Antioch—and despite his best attempts to
construct a clear sense of identity, he finds himself constrained by his immersion in the world of
elite, Greco-Roman education. He repeatedly appeals to Plato, Homer, Hesiod, and other nonChristian Greeks to support his arguments, making it absurd to assume that this stark divide in
moral behavior he attempts to construct—not even attainable in his own writings—would be borne
out in the actions, deeds, and behaviors of entire people-groups inhabiting a cosmopolitan urban
center.
In the Paedagogus, Clement implements an amusing rhetorical trick in order to support his
efforts, characterizing Plato as “well versed in pagan philosophy,” rather than describing the
philosopher himself as ethnikos.262 This is a claim which could as easily be made of Clement
himself, but that would certainly lead to an uncomfortably close association with the drunken,
unrestrained, and lustful ethnē. Clement skillfully weakens this claim by distancing Plato himself
from these non-Christians, describing him as “well versed” in their philosophy, yet not necessarily
a practitioner of it. He subtly calls into question the “pagan-ness” or “otherness” of Plato,
preferring to place emphasis on the presence of the Christ/Logos in his writings, and in doing so,
lessens the threat of his own similarity to the ethnē.
Whenever Clement speaks of these ethnē, it is in terms of their behavior and juxtaposing it
with his ethic of restraint. It is the “they” who “mind the flesh” and the “we” who possess restraint.
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Through the previously mentioned reframing of Greek philosophy as falling within his ethic of
restraint and characterization of the ethnē as a people-group defined by their carnal nature, Clement
is able to praise the disciples, apostles, and Abraham through the words of Hesiod and other ancient
Greeks, as men who seek to understand and thereby gain salvation.263 It is his Christians who are
“the good,” and the ethnē who are men “without understanding or self-control [who] can neither
perceive nor truly possess the good.”264

“The Wreathe of Wickedness:” The Threat of Lavish Clothing
Clement

sees

this

distinction

between

understanding/self-control

and

lack

of

understanding/indulgence as embodied through all manner of behavior, but we will begin with
what is often the most visible marker of an individual’s identity: style of dress. Although he has
much to say on the topic of how Christians should dress and publicly present themselves, he is
perhaps most vehement on the use of garlands and wreathes of flowers for personal adornment,
writing that they are only “proper to revelries and drinking parties.”265 In concert with his previous
condemnations of all such forms of raucous celebrations which “promote drunkenness and
promiscuity,” Clement’s desire for the “little ones” to steer clear of these adornments—and their
proper settings—is clear, but he further elaborates on the nature of their sinfulness.266 He writes
that “those who wear wreathes lose the pleasure the flower affords. They put it up on their heads,
out of sight, and cannot enjoy the pleasure of seeing it or even of smelling it . . . [this use] is
harmful, and causes the flower to wilt and to take revenge in the sense of remorse it leaves
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behind.”267 Appropriating God’s natural gifts for the misguided purpose of vanity or selfaggrandizement, is both a sin of waste and of pride, improper to the self-restrained Christian.
Once again, this does not go far enough for Clement and—demonstrating the necessity of
“the other”—he turns to the ethnē for contrast. He condemns wreathes and garlands through their
association with “pagan” cults and public displays of lust, writing that “those who celebrate the
festivals of Bacchus never think of performing their orgies without garlands and, once the flowers
encircle their brow, they work themselves into a frenzy over the mystic rite.”268 This description
of the shameless debauchery of “the other” allows Clement to plainly demand—without
articulating the rhetorical question—whether or not his readers would like to be seen, through the
association of similar dress, in this sort of company.
He asserts that “those who are educated by the Word will reject wreathes, not only because
they lie heavy upon the reason which has its seat in the head, nor only because the garland might
serve as a symbol of arrogance at a pagan festival, but because it has been dedicated to the service
of idols.”269 Again, it is not enough for Clement to lay out a program of behavior for Christians
(“what we should do”) but he finds it necessary to describe the behavior and practices of “the
other” (“what we should not do”). Clement treats the “wreathe of wickedness”—standing opposite
to Christ’s crown of thorns—extensively and asks whether it is correct for “us who celebrate the
holy suffering of the Lord, who know that He was crowned with thorns, to crown ourselves with
flowers,” before moving onto clothing in a more general manner.270 Again, while condemning
vibrant dyes, he writes that:
Garments colored like flowers should be left for the farces of the Bacchanals and
of the pagan mystery rites. To this must be added what the comic poet [Philemon]
267
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says: ‘Purple and silver plates are good enough for tragedies, but not for life.’ Our
lives ought to be different from a play. But Sardinian dye and those other violet and
green dyes, that compounded from the rose, and scarlet dye, and the thousand-andone others have all been invented with so much eagerness the more to gratify
demoralizing love of luxury. These kinds of garments are not for clothing’s sake,
but for appearance. They must all be renounced.271
He first links the usage of these dyes to the Bacchic rites and his othered ethnē, before turning to
an ancient “pagan” poet—here Philemon, and subsequently Aristophanes—to serve as proof of his
argument, and finally concludes that such garments are worthless outside of the arena of selfaggrandizement. This repeated pattern of returning to these writers for justification and example,
indeed for the very boundaries he seeks to construct around the “Christian,” is endemic to
Clement’s writing and it is not limited to the colossal and inescapable figures of Plato and Homer.
Throughout every chapter of the Paedagogus, Clement cites the non-Christian from obscurity to
renown, demonstrating just how embedded he was in his particular social role. This is not to say
that he does not give Hebrew Scripture its due; quoting from Sirach, he writes that the Educator
advises that we should “glory not in apparel,” and proposes that “if there is need for some other
color, the natural color of real life is sufficient.”272 Additionally, when forgoing certain types of
“luxurious” fabrics, he writes: “The Spirit clothed the Lord with another similar garment when it
said in the psalm of David: ‘I will put on praise and beauty, clothed with light as with a garment’
. . . Therefore, we must avoid any irregularity in the type of garment we choose. We must also
guard against all waywardness in our use of them.”273
On women bleaching and dyeing their hair or making use of various forms of makeup, he
quotes the Greek poet Menander to disparage them and to question their chastity: “‘Creep out of
this house, a chaste woman should never make her hair blonde,’ or for that matter paint her cheeks
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or shade under her eyes.”274 Continuing on the theme of physical adornment leading to moral decay
and the misuse of God’s gifts—reminiscent of his criticism of the improper use of floral
wreathes—he writes that “these deluded souls are actually destroying their natural beauty, without
being aware of it, when they add all this artificial beauty.”275 For him, these “misuses” are signs
of indulgence and a lack of self-restraint. And the end-product of this delusion? Clement is
characteristically descriptive and writes that these women will “undermine their own reputation as
noble women, break up homes, destroy marriages, and bring into the world illegitimate
children.”276 Again he links morality to self-presentation, and again he cites the condemnations of
the dramatists Antiphanes and Alexis (even while explicitly labeling the former an ethnikos) in
order to delineate the parameters of both “Christian” and ethnikos identities.277
Clement explains his heavy use of quotes by writing: “I quote all these passages to turn
you from vanity with all its ill-devised schemes sprung from worldly wisdom. But, since the Word
is ever ready and willing to save us, I will in a few moments also suggest the remedy sacred
Scripture proposes.”278 It is notable that Clement acknowledges the applicability of Scripture to
the moral task at hand, while also first appealing to ancient Greek writers, such as Menander,
Aristophanes, Antiphanes, and Alexis. This both demonstrates that the line between “Christian”
behavior and that of the surrounding ethnē is not as obvious in their physical presentations as
Clement would like, but also that he himself does not desire to fully exorcise the moral lessons of
his “pagan” predecessors.
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“The Organs Beneath the Stomach:” The Threat of Indulgent Sexuality
Another example of Clement’s indebtedness to Greek philosophy is visible when examining his
views on marriage and sexuality, which David G. Hunter characterizes as “borrowing directly from
the works of Musonius and Plutarch . . . [and articulating] Christian theology that was in harmony
with the prevailing philosophical ideals, especially those of the Stoic tradition.”279 Clement’s
views on sexuality can be easily summed up in stating that he advocated for the restriction of all
sexual relations, aside from when intended for procreation, an argument that fits him comfortably
among Musonius and the other Stoics.280 He writes that:
It remains for us now to consider the restriction of sexual intercourse to those who
are joined in wedlock. Begetting children is the goal of those who wed, and the
fulfillment of that goal is a large family, just as hope of a crop drives the farmer to
sow his seed, while the fulfillment of his hope is the actual harvesting of the crop.
But he who sows in a living soil is far superior, for the one tills the land to provide
food only for a season, the other to secure the preservation of the whole human
race; the one tends his crop for himself, the other, for God. We have received the
command: ‘Be fruitful,’ l and we must obey. In this role man becomes like God,
because he co-operates, in his human way, in the birth of another man.281
Sexual intercourse is a facet of humankind’s process of deification, in that it allows for this
cooperation in creation. But it is not only a divine injunction; Clement also understands sexuality
as a distinguishing marker of identity, once again separating the restrained Christians from the
lustful ethnē. He argues that as Christians, “we must keep a firm control over the pleasures of the
stomach, and an absolutely uncompromising control over the organs beneath the stomach.”282
Again, Clement turns to Plato and to Moses, without indication of any contradiction
between them and with the assumption that the former was a philosophical descendant of the latter.
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On the topic of sexual intercourse without the possibility of procreation—in this case the sexual
abuse of boys—Clement writes that Plato, “the philosopher who learned from Moses, taught: ‘Do
not sow seeds on rocks and stones, on which they will never take root.’”283 Shortly afterwards, he
writes that “noble Plato,” warns against adultery and sewing “the unconsecrated and bastard seed
with concubines, where you would not want what is sown to grow.”284 Again, his use of Plato is
tied back to the revelation of the Christ/Logos in Hebrew Scripture through the assertion that Plato
“had read this in the holy Scripture and from it had taken the Law.”285
If “Christianness” equates with the divine plan of the Christ/Logos, which entails the
fruitful but restrained procreation of the human race, then the threat of sexual misconduct is
apparent. Should Clement’s readers participate in the same varieties of “fornication” as the ethnē,
they would blur and threaten the boundary and ethic of restraint, as well as the very core of “the
Christian” as a distinct genos. The ultimate threat to this genos, stemming from “the organs beneath
the stomach,” will be revisited in the concluding subsection of this chapter, as a threat to the
concept of “humanness” itself.

“Gorging Oneself Intemperately:” The Threat of Improper Table Manners
For Clement, as for many of his elite Greco-Roman contemporaries, table etiquette was a matter
of great importance and carried significant moral weight, particularly for a writer so dedicated to
constructing a “Christian” identity centered on an ethic of restraint.286 Blake Leyerle uses modern
scholarship on etiquette to demonstrate the effectiveness of “politeness” as a mode of promoting
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group cohesion during the “ritual moment of commensality,” and links this to the importance that
Clement places on said restraint.287 Clement understood this “politeness” as an important factor in
embodying “Christianness.”
Although we may not innately understand table etiquette as demonstrative of morality, this
was certainly the case in Clement’s second century, elite, Alexandrian environment and he made
it a point of import that Christians embody their “inward, Christian disposition” through their
mannerisms while eating.288 Leyerle characterizes Clement as “agreeing” with “elite GrecoRoman opinion that self-definition was the aim of polite dining.”289 Yet, as a point of clarification,
I would eliminate the phrasing of “agreeing” as it seems to imply that Clement is an outsider,
participating in Greco-Roman elite societal norms. Rather, Clement is simply reflecting those
norms onto a burgeoning people-group, whom he identifies with.
Clement’s concern on the topic of table etiquette is that Christians cultivate an ethic of
restraint through a public demonstration of self-control and mild mannerisms. While the actual
consumption of food is his primary emphasis, he does not gloss over the other facets of communal
dining, such as conversation, gestures, and even the potential for laughter and belching. He laments
the thought of women opening their mouths in apparently suggestive demonstrations, belching, or
exposing their throats while eating and drinking, writing that “if only they would not keep their
lips wide open as they drink from big cups, with their mouths distorted out of shape!”290 Indecency,
the suggestion of indecency, and even the potential shadow of indecency if hunted for—as Clement
certainly does—is a constant threat in his imagined meal setting. Similarly, even laughter is suspect
in that it is “an exposure of one’s private interior, [and] such behavior might also lead to
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misunderstandings.”291 Excessive laughter is “a sure index of lack of self-control” and “even the
smile [should] be kept under the influence of the Educator.”292 In all of these minutiae, Clement
desires that a detached self-restraint characterize the behavior of a “Christian.”
It is important to note that Clement often seems to depict these banquets as “quite large
and heterogeneous,” gatherings where his readers could expect to be in the company of “the
other.”293 This is explicit when he writes that he would prefer Christians not to dine with nonChristians, but “if some unbeliever invites us to a banquet and we decide to accept—although it is
well not to associate with the disorderly—the Apostle bids us eat what is set before us,” alluding
to 1 Corinthians 10:27.294 Despite Clement’s othering language, this is an acknowledgement of the
difficulties of non-literary social interactions in the Greco-Roman world, which necessitated that
boundaries be upheld or policed only cautiously and situationally, allowing for mingling,
interaction, and exchange as demanded by specific circumstances.295 Despite the sharpness of his
boundary, the frontier rears its head, even in the Paedagogus.
The “others” were not distant or foreign adversaries of Clement’s, but rather neighbors and
fellow elites. Without this understanding, Clement’s assertion that “we must partake of what is set
before us . . . out of respect for him who has invited us and not to lessen or destroy the sociability
of the gathering” would seem strange, not because he is concerned with public appearances, but
because he is concerned to show respect for a member of the ethnē and the “sociability” of a mixed
gathering and because he admits the likelihood of such banquets.296
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Approaching the topic of the actual consumption of the meal, Clement is even more severe,
advising that Christians should “partake of only a few things that are necessary . . . [because] we
do not need to abstain from rich foods completely, but we should not be anxious for them . . . [and]
we should consider the rich variety of dishes that are served as a matter of indifference, and despise
delicacies.”297 Again, his first priority is that Christians remain intellectually—and visibly so—
removed from fleshly pleasure, and to assert this as a distinguishing mark between them and the
non-Christian banqueters. When consuming food, Clement writes that:
We must keep ourselves free of any suspicion of boorishness or of intemperance,
by partaking of what is set before us politely, keeping our hands, as well as our chin
and our couch, clean, and by preserving proper decorum of conduct, without
twisting about or acting unmannerly while we are swallowing our food. Rather, we
should put our hand out only in turn, from time to time; keep from speaking while
eating, for speech is inarticulate and ill-mannered when the mouth is full, and the
tongue, impeded by the food, cannot function properly but utters only indistinct
sounds. It is not polite to eat and drink at the same time, either, because it indicates
extreme intemperance to try to do two things together that need to be done
separately.298
He minces no words when asserting the importance of good manners and a public show of selfrestraint, writing that “lack of moderation, an evil wherever it is found, is particularly blameworthy
in the matter of food.”299 “Particularly blameworthy” is strong language for a man who spends
much of the Paedagogus lambasting sexual immorality, sinful passions, public indecency, and all
manner of luxurious excess. Yet, he is adamant on the unique dangers that accompany his readers
when they feast or banquet in public or in large, private gatherings, writing:
Is it not utterly inane to keep leaning forward from one's couch, all but falling on
one's nose into the dishes, as though, according to the common saying, one were
leaning out from the nest of the couch to catch the escaping vapors with the nostrils?
Is it not completely contrary to reason to keep dipping one's hands into these
pastries or to be forever stretching them out for some dish, gorging oneself
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intemperately and boorishly, not like a person tasting a food, but like one taking it
by storm? It is easy to consider such men swine or dogs rather than men, because
of their voraciousness.300
From this we can gather that the particular threat entailed by ill-manners at the table is that it is not
only a moral failing of the supposedly restrained “Christian,” but also that it is one committed in
front of others. But another—and for Clement, more grave—danger can be found in the
comparison of “such men” to voracious animals; to inhuman creatures which lack the reasoning
mind. This rhetorical stripping of their humanity is the final component of Clement’s
understanding of self-restraint, the “Christian” identity he argues for, and “humanness” itself,
which I will explore in the closing section.

Vain Peacocks and Fornicating Hyenas: The Threat of the Inhuman and the Animal
“Other”
Previously, I argued that Clement understands “Christianness” as the fulfillment of the
Christ/Logos’ intent for all humankind; this argument is necessary for understanding the most
potent and dangerous “other” throughout the Paedagogus. If the Christian is to be the “complete”
human, then their opposite is not the animalistic ethnē, but animals themselves. Tying this back to
the theme of table etiquette, Leyerle writes that “the task of etiquette is to intervene in order to
distance human eating from that of animals . . . the point is precisely that we must act civilly and
not naturally.”301 This is a claim which can be seen throughout the Paedagogus as Clement
repeatedly ties the behaviors of the ethnē, and those lacking in restraint, to various animals and
their associated indulgences.
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In his critique of the vanity of extravagant dress, Clement calls for “eliminating all that is
superfluous,” immediately followed by lambasting “the unnecessary luxuries that women wear . .
. because of such vanity and pleasure, women become flighty and vain as peacocks, and even
desert their husbands. Therefore, we should take care that the women are attired properly, and
clothed abundantly in the modesty of self-restraint.”302 When turning to matters of the stomach,
he cites Aristotle to warn against “burying your mind deep in your belly; [causing you to] resemble
the so-called ass-fish which Aristotle claims is the only living thing which has its heart in its
stomach, and which the comic poet Epicharmis entitles ‘the hugebellied.’”303 Concerning sexuality
and the sexual excesses of the ethnē, he writes that man should avoid becoming like the hyena,
which is “of all animals the most sensual,” and possessing both a “hyperactive abnormal sexuality”
and an orifice without procreative purposes, which Clement illustrates in order to condemn nonprocreative sexual acts.304 He writes that:
Yet, nature has not allowed even the most sensual of beasts to sexually misuse the
passage made for excrement. Urine she gathers into the bladder; undigested food in
the intestines; tears in the eyes; blood in the veins; wax in the ear, and mucous in
the nose; so, too, there is a passage connected to the end of the intestines by means
of which excrement is passed off. In the case of hyenas, nature, in her diversity, has
added this additional organ to accommodate their excessive sexual activity.
Therefore, it is large enough for the service of the lusting organs, but its opening is
obstructed within. In short, it is not made to serve any purpose in generation. The
clear conclusion that we must draw, then, is that we must condemn sodomy, all
fruitless sowing of seed, any unnatural methods of holding intercourse and the
reversal of the sexual role in intercourse.305
It is the threat of metamorphosis that lingers at the boundary of “Christianness” and this threat is
embodied in the extravagances of the ethnē. Whether it be “impure passions [which] makes a man
resemble a boar or pig,” incestuous acts that make sons “like wild boars well-practiced in sexual-
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indulgence,” or even the idea of elderly men dying their gray hair in order to “slip their old age off
over their heads, like the snake, and change themselves back to being young again,” Clement
condemns a lack of restraint in language that cautions against the animalistic.306 If “the Christian”
is meant to practice an ethic of restraint in order to fully realize their potential as “human,” then
“the ethnē” are set up in opposition, as practicing a non-ethic of indulgence and threatening to
cross the boundary between the human and the animal. This dichotomy makes Clement’s idealized
boundary all the more important, as it not only shuts out those who differ in practice and belief,
but also the threat of the truest “other:” the non-human.
In the conversion—exchanging of one genos for another—Clement expects that newly
made “Christians,” those needing instruction, are to leave behind their sinful behavior, abandon
self-indulgence, and take up an ethic of restraint. This restraint must not only be internally realized,
but externally practiced through temperance in all forms of human appetite, modesty in dress, and
dignified behavior that marks the “Christian” as distinct from various species of beast and the
indulgent ethnē. Despite this, the line that Clement imagines and the actual practices of everyday
“Christians,” are not identical and even in Clement’s own imaginings, he crosses said line on
hundreds of occasions to draw from the ethnikos philosophias. Yet all of this is inherent to the
messiness that is the process of identity, constructed through text and never fully embodied to the
imagined extent that its architects intend, not even in their own words.
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V. Conclusion
I maintain, then, that food and clothing and dishes, and, in a word, all the items of
the household, ought to be, as a general rule, in keeping with a Christian way of life
and in conformity with what is fitting, adapted to person, age, occupation, and
occasion. For we are servants of the one God, and so ought to insure that our
belongings and the equipment needed for them manifest the one noble way of life.
Every individual, in unquestioning faith and in his own individual way of life,
should openly perform the duties that naturally follow from, and are consonant
with, this one mentality.307
In writing the above, Clement articulates both his intention for “Christianness” to be embodied
and his overarching purpose in writing the Paedagogus. Namely, he seeks to give instructions to
Christians on exactly how to behave and present themselves, down to the most minute details of
how they should eat, drink, and dress; the purpose of all of this being to “manifest the one noble
way of life,” as “servants of the one God.” In doing so, Clement calls upon a vast reservoir of nonChristian ethical and poetic citations, and utilizes the standard rhetoric and linguistic tools of
identity to describe people-groups in the second century, Greek, Mediterranean world. This
embeddedness in his social environment is demonstrative of the porous nature of identity itself.
No matter how vehement the constructors of identity make their appeals, no identity can be isolated
from the world or completely insulated from the influence of “the other.”
This thesis has attempted to demonstrate the utility of understanding identity as process in
an examination of Clement’s Paedagogus, while contributing more detail and texture to Clement’s
understanding of “the Christian” in opposition and relationship with “the ethnē.” Clement’s
surviving writings demonstrate the importance of an authoritative past in identity formation,
particularly in its relevance to legitimacy. Clement claims this through a patrilineage that traces
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back to the Christ/Logos, though often flows through many channels, whether that be the apostles,
Hebrew scripture, or Greek philosophy. Inseparable from this attempt to establish authority, and
from the process of identity itself, is the necessity of “the other.”
It is the threat of similarity with “the other” that necessitates Clement’s totalizing language.
“The other”—whether Christian or ethnē—ate, bathed, and lived alongside Clement’s “little ones.”
This proximity, indeed the lived frontier itself, endangered the distinction between these peoplegroups, as defined by their practices and actions. The Paedagogus is, in part, Clement’s attempt to
erect and fortify literary boundaries with the intent that they would be reflected in the actions of
his readers and reinforce the lived distinction between “the Christian” and “the other.” This
distinction puts the intended purpose of humanity, fulfilled in “the life called Christian,” on one
side of his boundary, and a degradation into the animalistic behavior of the ethnē on the other.308
For Clement, these ethnē and their behaviors, demonstrate the dangers of a lack of self-restraint.
They represent and embody the “what we are to avoid.”309
Yet even in his writings—removed from the lived frontier of second century Alexandrian
Christians—Clement shows the porousness of these boundaries and his own embeddedness in a
non-Christian society. So-called “pagans,” penetrate it at every turn. Clement repeatedly quotes
Plato, Aristotle, Aristophanes and others in order to strengthen his moral condemnations of the
ethnē and their lack of self-restraint. Clement, while professing something “new” in his Christian
faith, is also contributing to an existing form of social critique, originating with non-Christian
precursors. The program of the Paedagogus itself is reminiscent of Plato’s imagined kallipolis, as
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an attempt to craft an ideal society, comprised of ideal individuals. Clement’s own language
indicates this purpose when he describes the type of men who “are to be excluded from our city.”310
As Clement occupies an interesting location in Church history—as a particularly “Greek”
Church Father—and an uncomfortable place in theology—not always orthodox, but not
necessarily unorthodox—interrogating his constructions of “Christian” identity can offer
important insights into the questions facing the Church today and there is much exciting work to
be done and conversations to be had in this regard. Clement insists upon clear boundaries and a
visible, concrete “Christian” identity that is to be embodied and publicly displayed. However,
overlap in interpersonal exchange and lived realities, as well as deviation from prescribed norms,
is and was an inevitability, and even in Clement’s own writings there are traces of the problematic
“other.”
Clement’s fondness for Plato leaves the classical philosopher in an uncomfortable position,
as certainly not a Christian and yet, not necessarily a member of the ethnē either. Clement
understands him as possessing some measure of wisdom through his familiarity with Hebrew
scripture and the presence of the Christ/Logos in Greek philosophy, but without the understanding
that could only be brought through the Incarnation, Crucifixion, and Resurrection. This leaves
Plato—and many other philosophers—in a category that is not “Christian,” but not fully “other.”
It is certainly an uncomfortability in Clement’s writing, yet I read this uncomfortability, not as a
weakness of Clement’s theology or construction of identity, but rather as a point of notable
honesty. An honesty in how we engage with the world outside the boundaries of our various,
intersecting, overlapping, and often conflicting senses of identity. Clement’s assertion that the
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Word “teaches all things, and uses all things to educate us,” seems to me, true enough that it should
give us pause when dismissing that which makes us uncomfortable.311
In concluding this work, I think it is perhaps best to give Clement the final word.
O Educator, be gracious to Thy children, O Educator, Father, Guide of Israel, Son
and Father, both one, Lord. Give to us, who follow Thy command, to fulfill the
likeness of Thy image, and to see, according to our strength, the God who is both a
good God and a Judge who is not harsh. Do Thou Thyself bestow all things on us
who dwell in Thy peace, who have been placed in Thy city, who sail the sea of sin
unruffled, that we may be made tranquil and supported by the Holy Spirit, the
unutterable Wisdom, by night and day, unto the perfect day, to sing eternal
thanksgiving to the one only Father and Son, Son and Father, Educator and Teacher
with the Holy Spirit. All things are for the One, in whom are all things, through
whom, being the One, are all things, through whom eternity is, of whom all men
are members, to whom is glory, and the ages, whose are all things in their goodness;
all things, in their beauty; all things, in their wisdom; all things, in their justice. To
Him be glory now and forever. Amen.312
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